Displacement of a heavy cruiser. Heavy cruiser. With an increased supply of provisions and fresh water

Domestic cruisers of project 1144 "Orlan" is a series of four heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARK), which were designed in the USSR and built at the Baltic Shipyard from 1973 to 1998. They became the only surface ships in the Russian Navy equipped with a nuclear power plant. 18 September 2015, 09:25

According to the NATO codification, domestic cruisers of project 1144 Orlan received the designation Kirov-class battlecruiser, after the name of the first ship of the Kirov cruiser series (since 1992, Admiral Ushakov). In the West, they were classified as battlecruisers due to the exceptional size and armament of the ships. The chief designer of the nuclear cruisers of project 1144 was Boris Izrailevich Kupensky, the deputy chief designer was Yudin Vladimir Evgenievich.

Cruisers "Kirov" have no analogues in world shipbuilding. These ships could effectively carry out combat missions to destroy enemy surface ships and its submarines. The missile weapons installed on the ships made it possible to provide big share the probability of defeating large surface attack groups of the enemy. The ships of the series were the largest non-carrier attack warships in the world. For example, the American nuclear cruisers URO type "Virginia" in terms of displacement were 2.5 times smaller. Project 1144 Orlan cruisers were designed to destroy large surface targets, protect fleet formations from air attacks and submarines in remote areas of the oceans. These ships were armed with almost all types of combat and technical means, which were only created for surface ships in the USSR. main shock missile weapons cruisers had an anti-ship missile system "Granit".

On March 26, 1973, the laying of the first lead ship of Project 1144 took place at the Baltic Shipyard - the Kirov heavy nuclear missile cruiser (since 1992 - Admiral Ushakov), on December 27, 1977 the ship was launched, and on December 30, 1980 the TARK was handed over to the fleet. On October 31, 1984, the second ship of the series, the Frunze TARK (since 1992, the Admiral Lazarev), entered service. On December 30, 1988, the third ship was handed over to the fleet - TARK "Kalinin" (since 1992 "Admiral Nakhimov"). And in 1986, the plant began to build the last ship of this series - TARK "Peter the Great" (initially they wanted to call it "Kuibyshev" and "Yuri Andropov"). The construction of the ship fell on a difficult period in the history of the country. The collapse of the USSR led to the fact that the construction was completed only in 1996, and the tests in 1998. Thus, the ship was accepted into the fleet 10 years after the laying.

Heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Frunze" in the Indian Ocean during the transition to Vladivostok

The first cruiser of project 1144 Orlan (Kalinin)

To date, of the four, only the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser Pyotr Veliky is in service, which is the most powerful strike warship not only in the Russian Navy, but throughout the world. The first ship of the series "Admiral Ushakov" has been laid up since 1991, in 2002 it was withdrawn from the fleet. Its fate has already been decided - the ship will be scrapped at the defense shipyard Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center in Severodvinsk. According to experts, the disposal of this TARK will cost approximately 10 times more than the dismantling of the largest nuclear submarine, since there is simply no technology and experience in disposing of such warships in Russia. With a high degree of probability, the second ship of the series, the cruiser Admiral Lazarev, will suffer the same fate, the ship has been laid up in the Far East since 1999. But the third cruiser of project 11442 "Orlan" "Admiral Nakhimov" is currently undergoing repairs and modernization at Sevmash. It will be returned to the fleet at the turn of 2017-2018, previously called 2019. At the same time, according to CEO"Sevmash" Mikhail Budnichenko, the life of the cruiser after the completion of the repair will be extended by 35 years. It is assumed that the repaired TARK "Admiral Nakhimov" will continue to serve as part of the Russian Pacific Fleet, and "Peter the Great" will remain the flagship of the Russian Northern Fleet.

TARK project 11442 "Admiral Nakhimov" under repair

The heavy nuclear missile cruisers of Project 1144 "Orlan" did not have and do not have direct analogues abroad. Written off for this moment nuclear-powered American cruisers of the Long Beach type (17,500 tons) were 1.5 times smaller, and the Virginia (11,500 tons) 2.5 times smaller and had much weaker both qualitatively and quantitatively weapons. This could be explained by the different tasks that the ships faced. If in the American fleet they were only an escort for multi-purpose aircraft carriers, then in the Soviet fleet nuclear surface ships were created as independent combat units that could form the basis of the ocean combat forces of the fleet. The diverse armament of the Project 1144 TARK made these ships multi-purpose, but at the same time complicated their maintenance and created some problems with determining their tactical and technical niche.

The history of the creation of the cruisers of project 1144

In 1961, the first nuclear-powered cruiser URO Long Beach entered the US Navy, this event was the impetus for the resumption of theoretical work on the development of a surface combat nuclear ship in the Soviet Union. But even without taking into account the Americans, the Soviet Navy, which was entering its period of rapid development in those years, objectively needed ocean-going ships that could operate for a long time in isolation from coastal bases, the nuclear power plant was the best way to solve this problem. Already in 1964, research began again in the USSR to determine the appearance of the country's first combat nuclear surface ship. Initially, the research ended with the creation of a tactical and technical assignment for the development of a project for a large anti-submarine ship with a nuclear power plant and a displacement of 8,000 tons.

Heavy nuclear missile cruisers "Pyotr Veliky", "Admiral Ushakov", winter 1996-1997

When designing the ship, the designers proceeded from the fact that the solution of the main task could be achieved only if sufficient combat stability was ensured. Even then, no one doubted that the main danger to the ship would be aviation, so the creation of a layered air defense system of the ship was initially envisaged. At the initial stage of development, the designers believed that to combine all necessary equipment and armament in one hull will be very difficult, so the option of creating a pair of two nuclear surface ships was considered: the BOD of project 1144 and the missile cruiser of project 1165. The first ship was supposed to carry anti-submarine weapons, the second - anti-ship cruise missiles (ASC). These two ships were supposed to operate as part of a formation, covering each other from various threats, they were equipped with anti-aircraft weapons approximately on an equal footing, which should have contributed to the creation of a strong layered air defense. However, as the project developed, it was decided that it would be most rational not to separate anti-submarine and anti-ship functions, but to combine them in one cruiser. After that, work on the design of the nuclear cruiser of project 1165 was stopped and all the efforts of the developers were repopulated on the project 1144 ship that became universal.

In the course of work, increasing requirements for the project led to the fact that the ship received an increasing range of weapons and various equipment - which, in turn, was reflected in an increase in displacement. As a result, the project of the first Soviet nuclear-powered surface warship quickly moved away from narrow anti-submarine functions, acquiring a multi-purpose orientation, and its standard displacement exceeded 20,000 tons. The cruiser was supposed to carry all the most modern types of combat and technical equipment that were created in the Soviet Union for combat surface ships. This evolution was reflected in the new classification of the ship - "heavy nuclear missile cruiser", which was assigned in June 1977, already during the construction of the lead ship of the series, which was laid down as a "nuclear anti-submarine cruiser".

In its final form, the technical design of the new nuclear surface ship was approved in 1972 and received the code 1144 Orlan. The project of the first Soviet surface combat nuclear-powered ship was developed at the Northern Design Bureau in Leningrad. B. I. Kupensky became the chief designer of project 1144, and from the USSR Navy, Captain 2nd Rank A. A. Savin was the main supervisor of the design and construction of the cruiser from the very beginning until the ship was handed over to the fleet.

Lead ship of the series, Project 1144 cruiser "Kirov".

From the very beginning, the new nuclear-powered ship became the favorite brainchild of S. G. Gorshkov, who served as Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy. Despite this, the design of the ship was difficult and rather slow. The increase in the displacement of the cruiser as the requirements for the project were revised and amended forced the designers to look for more and more options for the main power plant of the ship - first of all, its steam-producing part. At the same time, Gorshkov demanded that a reserve power plant be placed on the cruiser, which would run on organic fuel. The fears of the military of those years could be understood: the Soviet and world experience in operating nuclear-powered ships in those years was not large enough, and even today accidents with the failure of the reactor happen from time to time. At the same time, a surface warship, unlike a submarine, can afford to switch from a nuclear reactor to burning ordinary fuel in furnaces - it was decided to use this advantage in full. It was assumed that the reserve boiler could also help in securing the ship's parking. The underdeveloped system of basing large warships in the Soviet Union has long been a sore spot for the navy.

While the lead ship of the series was still on the slipway, an improved project had already been created for the next cruiser, which received the index 11442. It provided for the replacement of some types of weapons and equipment with the latest systems at that time: the Kortik anti-aircraft artillery system (ZRAK) instead of the tower 30- mm six-barreled machine guns; The Kinzhal air defense system instead of the Osa-MA air defense system, the AK-130 universal twin 130-mm mount instead of two single-gun 100-mm AK-100 turrets on the Kirov, the Vodopad anti-submarine system instead of the Metel, rocket launchers RBU- 12000 instead of RBU-6000, etc. It was planned that all ships of the series following the Kirov cruiser would be built according to an improved design, but in fact, due to the unavailability of all planned weapons for serial production, they were added to ships under construction as development was completed. In the end, only the last ship, Peter the Great, could correspond to project 11442, but even with reservations, and the second and third ships Frunze and Kalinin occupied an intermediate position between the first and last ships of the series in terms of armament.

Description of the design of the cruisers of project 1144

All cruisers of project 1144 "Orlan" had a hull with an elongated (more than 2/3 of the total length) forecastle. The hull is divided into 16 main compartments by means of watertight bulkheads. Throughout the TARK hull there are 5 decks. In the bow of the ship, under the bulb fairing, there is a fixed antenna of the Polynom sonar complex. In the stern of the ship there is an under-deck hangar, which is designed for the permanent deployment of 3 Ka-27 helicopters, as well as rooms for storing fuel supplies and a lift designed to bring helicopters to the upper deck. Here, in the aft part of the ship, there is a compartment with a lifting and lowering device for the towed antenna of the Polynomial hydroacoustic complex. The advanced superstructures of the heavy cruiser are made with the wide use of aluminum-magnesium alloys. The bulk of the ship's armament is concentrated at the stern and in the bow.

Heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great"

Project 1144 cruisers are protected from receiving combat damage by anti-torpedo protection, a double bottom along the entire length of the hull, as well as local armoring of vital parts of the TARK. As such, there is no belt armor on the cruisers of project 1144 "Orlan" - the armor protection is located in the depths of the hull - however, along the waterline from the bow of the ship to its stern, a thickened sheathing belt 3.5 meters high was laid (of which 2.5 meters above the waterline and 1 meter below the waterline), which plays an important role in the structural protection of the cruiser.

TARK project 1144 "Orlan" became the first warships after the Second World War, in the project of which a sufficiently developed reservation was incorporated. So engine rooms, missile cellars of the Granit complexes and reactor compartments are protected from the sides by 100 mm (below the waterline - 70 mm) and from the deck side by 70 mm armor. The premises of the combat information post of the ship and the main command post, which are located inside its hull at the waterline level, also received armor protection: they are covered with 100-mm side walls with a 75-mm roof and traverses. In addition, in the stern of the cruiser there is armor on the sides (70 mm) and on the roof (50 mm) of the helicopter hangar, as well as around the storage of ammunition and aviation fuel. There is also a local reservation above the tiller compartments.

The nuclear power plant with KN-3 reactors (VM-16 type core), although based on OK-900 icebreaking reactors, has significant differences from them. The main one is in fuel assemblies containing uranium with a high degree of enrichment (approximately 70%). The service life of such a core until the next recharge is 10-11 years. The reactors installed on the cruiser are double-circuit, thermal neutron, water-cooled. As a coolant and moderator, they use bidistillate - high purity water, which circulates through the reactor core under high pressure (about 200 atmospheres), ensuring the boiling of the secondary circuit, which eventually goes to the turbines in the form of steam.

Special attention the developers paid attention to the possibility of using a two-shaft power plant of the cruiser, the power on each shaft of which is 70,000 hp. The complex-automated nuclear power plant was located in 3 compartments and included 2 nuclear reactors with a total thermal power of 342 MW, 2 turbo-gear units (located forward and aft of the reactor compartment), as well as 2 backup automated boilers KVG-2, mounted in turbine compartments. When operating only a backup power plant - without using nuclear reactors- cruiser project 1144 "Orlan" is able to reach a speed of 17 knots, fuel reserves are enough to go at this speed 1300 nautical miles. The use of nuclear reactors provides the cruiser with a full speed of 31 knots and an unlimited cruising range. The power plant installed on the ships of this project would be able to provide heat and electricity to a city whose population would be 100-150 thousand inhabitants. And the well-thought-out hull contours and large displacement provide the TARK of project 1144 "Orlan" with excellent seaworthiness, which is especially important for warships in the ocean zone.

The crew of the TARK project 1144/11442 consists of 759 people (including 120 officers). There are 1600 rooms to accommodate the crew on board the ship, including 140 single and double cabins, which are intended for officers and midshipmen, 30 cabins for sailors and foremen for 8-30 people each, 15 showers, two baths, a sauna with a 6x2 pool , 5 meters, a two-level medical block (outpatient, operating room, infirmary-isolations, X-ray room, dental office, pharmacy), a gym with exercise equipment, 3 wardrooms for midshipmen, officers and admirals, as well as a lounge for relaxation and even its own cable TV studio.

The armament of the cruisers of project 1144 "Orlan"

The main weapons of these cruisers were the P-700 "Granit" anti-ship missiles - third-generation supersonic cruise missiles with a reduced flight path profile to the target. With a launch weight of 7 tons, these missiles developed a speed of up to 2.5 M and could carry a conventional warhead weighing 750 kg or a monoblock nuclear charge with a capacity of up to 500 kt at a distance of up to 625 km. The missile is 10 meters long and 0.85 meters in diameter. 20 anti-ship cruise missiles "Granit" were installed under the upper deck of the cruiser, with an elevation angle of 60 degrees. Launchers CM-233 for these missiles were produced at the Leningrad Metal Plant. For the reason that the Granit missiles were originally intended for submarines, the installation must be filled with sea water before launching the missile. According to the experience of operational and combat training of the Navy, it is very difficult to shoot down the Granit. Even if anti-missile anti-ship missiles are hit, due to its enormous speed and mass, it can retain sufficient momentum in order to “get” the target ship.

Launcher of the shipborne air defense system "Fort-M"

The basis of the anti-aircraft missile armament of the Project 1144 Orlan cruisers was the S-300F (Fort) missile system, which was placed below deck on rotating drums. The full ammunition of the complex consisted of 96 anti-aircraft missiles. On the only ship of the Peter the Great series (instead of one S-300F complex), a unique S-300FM Fort-M bow complex appeared, which was produced in one copy. Each such complex is able to simultaneously fire up to 6 maneuvering small targets (accompany up to 12 targets) and direct 12 missiles at them simultaneously in the conditions of active and passive interference by the enemy. Due to the design features of the missiles of the S-300FM complex, the Peter the Great ammunition load was reduced by 2 missiles. Thus, the Peter the Great TARK is armed with one S-300FM system with 46 48N6E2 missiles and one S-300F system with 48 48N6E missiles, the full ammunition load consists of 94 missiles. "Fort-M" was created on the basis of the army air defense system S-Z00PMU2 "Favorite". This complex, unlike its predecessor, the Fort anti-aircraft complex, is able to hit targets at a distance of up to 120 km and successfully fight enemy anti-ship missiles at altitudes up to 10 meters. The expansion of the affected area of ​​the complex was achieved by improving the sensitivity of the receiving channels and the energy characteristics of the transmitter.

The second echelon of the cruiser's air defense is the Kinzhal air defense system, which was included in project 11442, but in reality appeared only on the last ship of the series. The main task of this complex is the defeat of air targets that broke through the first air defense line of the cruiser (SAM "Fort"). The basis of the "Dagger" are solid-propellant, single-stage, remote-controlled missiles 9M330, which are unified with the air defense system of the ground forces "Tor-M1". Rockets take off vertically with the engine inoperative under the action of the catapult. The reloading of missiles is automatic, the launch interval is 3 seconds. The target detection range in automatic mode is 45 km, the number of simultaneously fired targets is 4, the reaction time is 8 seconds. The Kinzhal air defense system operates offline (without the participation of personnel). According to the specification, each Project 11442 cruiser was supposed to have 128 such missiles in 16x8 installations.

The third frontier of air defense is the Kortik ZRAK, which is a short-range defense complex. It is designed to replace the conventional 30-mm six-barreled artillery systems AK-630. ZRAK "Kortik" in television-optical and radar modes is able to provide full automation of combat control from target detection to its destruction. Each installation consists of two 30-mm six-barreled AO-18 assault rifles, the total rate of fire of which is 10,000 rounds per minute, and two units of 4 two-stage 9M311 rockets. These missiles have a fragmentation-rod warhead and a proximity fuse. In the turret compartment of each installation there are 32 such missiles in transport and launch containers. The 9M311 missiles are unified with the 2S6 Tunguska land complex and are able to deal with anti-ship missiles, guided bombs, helicopters and enemy aircraft. The range of action of the missile part of the Kortik ZRAK is 1.5-8 km, it is fired from 30-mm artillery mounts at a distance of 1500-50 meters. The height of the affected air targets is 5-4000 meters. In total, each of the three Project 11442 cruisers was supposed to have 6 such complexes, the ammunition of which consisted of 192 missiles and 36,000 shells.

The anti-submarine armament of the Project 1144 cruiser was represented by the Metel complex, which in Project 11442 was replaced by the more modern Vodopad anti-submarine complex. Unlike the Blizzard, the Waterfall does not need a separate launcher - the missile-torpedoes of the complex are loaded into standard torpedo tubes. Rocket model 83RN (or 84RN with a nuclear warhead), like an ordinary torpedo, is fired from a torpedo tube with compressed air and dives into the water. Then, upon reaching a certain depth, the rocket engine is launched and the rocket-torpedo takes off from under the water and delivers the warhead to the target area - up to 60 kilometers from the carrier ship - after which the warhead is separated. UMGT-1, a 400-mm small-sized homing torpedo, can be used as a warhead. The range of the UMGT-1 torpedo, which can be mounted on rocket torpedoes, is 8 km, the speed is 41 knots, and the depth is 500 meters. There are up to 30 such torpedo missiles in the cruiser's ammunition load.

The high state of German technology and engineering simply did not allow the creation of an obviously unsuccessful project, although in the case of the Admiral Hipper-class cruisers, one can partly say that such an attempt was made. In general, comparing warships of different nations built in accordance with different strategic and tactical ideas is a thankless task. This is especially true during the Second World War, when the priority was shifting from factors related to purely artillery combat (the number and quality of guns, armor) to “instrumental” elements, such as fire control systems, radars, sonars and other high-tech equipment. However, we will try to give overall score German version of the heavy cruiser.

First of all, it is worth noting that despite the virtual absence of a displacement limit, which annoyed all other countries so much, the Germans failed to create either a more heavily armed or better protected ship. Armament "Hipper" (eight 203-mm guns) is equivalent to the "mandatory minimum" for Washington cruisers. At the same time, American ships of the same class had 9 guns, and Japanese - 10. Among the eight-gun heavy cruisers of the second generation, the German ones had, perhaps, the weakest protection. Algeri, one of the main potential opponents, had thicker belt and deck armor (respectively 110 mm + 40 mm bulkhead and 80 mm). The Italian Pola-class cruisers were even more heavily armored. The belt of the American "Wichita" - the last pre-war project, created even for a limited displacement, had a thickness of 163 mm, although on a smaller area than that of the "Germans". Against this background, an 80 mm belt reinforced with a 30 mm bevel (which provided protection approximately corresponding to 110-130 mm, taking into account the spacing of the armor and depending on the distance), did not look very impressive. In any case, the traditional principle of building German ships - enhanced protection, even at the expense of weapons - was not observed when creating the project for heavy cruisers. Even the most powerfully armed Japanese heavy cruisers, smaller in displacement and faster, had approximately the same level of armor (102 mm inclined belt, however, in a much smaller area). As a result, solidly protected large light cruisers armed with 12-15 six-inch guns (British "cities" and "colonies", American "Brooklyns" and "Clevelands") became dangerous opponents for the "Germans", especially at short distances, where played the density of fire.

Everything that has been said about the booking of "hippers" can be said about their underwater protection. The boule system with a thin (20 mm) main anti-torpedo bulkhead provided no more security than the Algeri 40 mm armored bulkhead with a developed double side system, or than the same boules plus the 25 mm bulkhead of Japanese heavy cruisers. However, this fact only testifies to the fundamental impossibility of providing sufficient underwater protection against modern torpedoes to any ship of this class. Survivability during underwater explosions was largely ensured by the large margin of buoyancy of the "box" itself and the thoroughness of the design and construction of all watertight bulkheads. Well, also good luck with a specific defeat. The fracture of the Eugen's stern seems to indicate the insufficient strength of the hull, but its behavior during an atomic explosion indicates the preservation of quite decent survivability even after a long service in the absence of proper "care".

Enough has already been said about the torment with the power plant. It is only worth noting that it did not provide particularly high driving performance. The speed of a little more than 32.5 knots per measured mile is by no means among the record ones. The seaworthiness of the "hippers" was satisfactory, but nothing more. For the Atlantic, the hull turned out to be rather low; the bow end in bad weather was heavily flooded with water, even after the “build-up” of the “Atlantic” stem.

Consistent consideration of moderate combat qualities may raise the question: where did such a significant excess displacement “evaporate”? The answer to the question can be obtained by considering the auxiliary weapons and equipment of the German heavy cruisers. If their armament does not look too impressive, then the fire control systems, perhaps, have no analogues among this class of ships. The complete duplication of the KDP and computer centers of the main and anti-aircraft caliber and their equipping with high-class optics and equipment gave the "hippers" almost "battleship" capabilities. By the power of heavy anti-aircraft weapons (twelve 105-mm guns), only American cruisers could compete with them, starting from " Wichita." All this took about 2500 tons. A lot of weight was "eaten" by the Germans' attempts to give their ships as much versatility as possible. Aircraft equipment, 12 torpedo tubes with spare torpedoes, supplies and stores also accounted for a significant part of the load.

This versatility and saturation of equipment has led to two very important consequences in terms of project evaluation. First, the size of the team has increased dramatically. Instead of 600-800 people on the cruisers of England, France and the USA, on the "hippers" the crew reached 1400-1600 people, and in military campaigns sailors were usually taken in addition to the set. Thus, heavy cruisers, like all German large ships, absorbed a large number of scarce trained personnel and, at first glance, Hitler’s purely voluntaristic decision to withdraw them to the reserve after the “New Year’s battle” in 1943 made a certain sense: the crew of one ship was equal to the number of teams of an entire flotilla of submarines.

The second consequence was the price. The Hipper and her sisterships proved to be exceptionally expensive ships. There are many reasons for this, in particular, the high cost of labor in Germany (fascism paid well for skilled labor at military enterprises), but the high cost of high-tech weapons and equipment that heavy cruisers were saturated with also played a significant role. Their value has steadily increased: from "Hipper" (85.9 million Reichsmarks) to "Prince Eugen" (104.5 million). It is enough to compare these figures with the price of "pocket battleships" (80–90 million) and real battleships of the Scharnhorst type (about 175 million) and Bismarck (180–200 million) to understand how expensive they were bought not too many advantages of the German heavy cruisers. Instead of two units of this class, it was theoretically possible to build an extra battleship, a ship several times more useful in all respects (in terms of protection, armament, range, degree of threat to the enemy and the possibility of diverting his forces). Or have 7 "pocket battleships" instead of a 5-ship series of heavy cruisers. This option seems to be especially preferable from the point of view of an attempt to conduct a cruising war. But the comparison with the cost of submarines “clogs” everything: according to German experts, each “hipper” is equivalent to about 25 submarines, which undoubtedly could be much more useful.

Even more striking is the high cost of the "Germans" in comparison with the heavy cruisers of other countries. In comparable prices, the cost of early units is over 4 million pounds, and "Eugen" - almost 5 million, while the British "County" cost about 2 million pounds. The difference increases even more if we take into account the much larger operating costs in the case of German cruisers, associated with a huge crew and high demands to the maintenance of a capricious mechanical installation.

As a result, claims to create a "big fleet" cost the Third Reich dearly, both in terms of the monetary and human costs themselves, and in terms of diverting them from other options for use. Heavy cruisers are perhaps the most striking illustration of this. Created to operate as part of the squadrons of a single fleet like the High Seas Fleet, they never found their "niche" in combat use, since the most striking episodes of their activities related to the shelling of coastal targets in the last stage of the Second World War can hardly be considered as such.

However, not all so simple. It may seem paradoxical, but despite all the above negative sides, the German project was largely the prototype of modern cruisers. Indeed, the Soviet Sverdlov-class cruisers built after the war are very similar in layout, characteristics and equipment to the 6-inch hipper version. Approximately similar in parameters (although more heavily armed) ships were designed by the British after the restrictions on displacement were lifted. The stake not on the brute power of a volley, but on ensuring high-quality fire control, on a higher versatility of combat units, has become the main trend in the further development of the class of cruisers, which, however, history has not left much time.

Heavy cruisers of the type "Stalingrad"

The construction of heavy cruisers of project 82, envisaged for delivery by a ten-year military shipbuilding plan for 1946-1955, was originally planned to be carried out at factories No. 402 in Molotovsk and No. 444 in Nikolaev, two ships each. In addition, it was supposed to additionally lay down one cruiser in 1953 and two more cruisers in 1955. The new ships were designed taking into account the experience of the Second World War and progress in the development of naval weapons and equipment.

The history of the design of heavy cruisers of project 82 began even before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and turned out to be very complex and dramatic. To a large extent, this was the result of increased attention and significant influence in the development and adoption of decisions on the main issues of their creation by I.V. Stalin, who at that time was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 - the Council of Ministers) of the USSR. In the first book of memoirs by N.G. Kuznetsov "On the eve" it was noted that I.V. Stalin had a special, hard to explain addiction to heavy cruisers.

After the signing in August - September 1939 of the Soviet-German non-aggression, friendship and border treaties, as well as a trade and credit agreement, negotiations began between October of the same year between the delegations of representatives of the USSR and Germany, culminating in the conclusion in February 1940 of an economic agreement, which provided for the supply to the USSR, in exchange for raw materials, of a wide range of engineering products, including weapons and military equipment. In connection with the reorientation, with the outbreak of World War II, of the German shipbuilding industry to the large-scale construction of submarines (due to the curtailment of the program of surface military shipbuilding), there was a possibility of acquiring several warships suspended by the completion of construction there.

Therefore, when on a business trip to Germany in the autumn of 1939, the first Soviet trade and procurement commission headed by the People's Commissar of the USSR shipbuilding industry I.T. Tevosyan, the specialists of the NKSP and the Navy, which were part of it, were instructed to familiarize themselves with and negotiate the acquisition of two or three heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type with 203-mm artillery, which had been mass-produced since 1935 (at that time, two ships of this type had already been transferred German fleet, and three were completed afloat). This would make it possible to replenish our fleet with valuable combat units at an accelerated pace, without reducing the number of ships under construction and planned for construction.

As a result of negotiations, the German side agreed to sell the USSR only one unfinished, the last in the series, cruiser "Lutzow", which had a technical readiness of about 50%, while pledging to ensure the supply of weapons and equipment to complete its construction and send a group of its specialists (the shipyard-builder to Bremen and its main contractors) for the period of completion of the ship. At the end of May 1940, in accordance with the concluded economic agreement, "Luttsov" (since September of the same year - "Petropavlovsk") arrived in tow in Leningrad and was put at the outfitting wall of plant No. 189.

Model of a heavy cruiser project 82, made in accordance with 073 1947

Its acquisition (as well as the leader of the Italian-built destroyers "Tashkent") provided our specialists with the opportunity to get acquainted with the latest foreign military equipment, take into account overseas experience and to introduce a number of advanced technical solutions for that time in the creation of new Russian-built ships of the Navy. In addition, this partially solved the issue of rational use of the reserve of outfitting workers available (before the launch of large ships on the stocks) at the leading Leningrad shipbuilding enterprises. If the German side fulfilled its obligations, the ship could be transferred to the Navy in 1942.

Heavy cruisers of the "Admiral Hipper" type had a more powerful, in comparison with the light cruisers of project 68 (of the "Chapaev" type) being built at that time for our fleet, artillery armament, inclined side armor belt with an armor thickness of 80 mm (equivalent to 100 mm vertical armor), stabilization of 105 mm universal gun mounts. They practically solved a number of topical and complex problems of military shipbuilding, on which Soviet specialists were working at that time: the introduction of welded structures of the hull and superstructures, the use of steam of high parameters (63 atm, 450 ° C), automatic control of the main elements of the power plant, an increase in the cruising range for due to the higher efficiency of the power plant, the use of roll stabilizers, a high degree of saturation of the ship with electrical equipment of direct and alternating current.

For the technological study of the working design documentation (RKD) coming from Germany for the cruiser "Lutzow" (project 83), a special "Bureau L" was organized in the building of the outfitting shop of plant No. 189. The translation of this RKD into Russian, its reissue according to the normative documentation in force in the USSR and the solution with the help of German specialists of the design issues that arise during the completion of the ship were assigned to TsKB-17, as a developer of cruiser projects.

After the acquisition of the "Luttsov" and a thorough study of the design documentation for it, the question arose of the advisability of creating on this basis more advanced ships of the same subclass, armed with 203-mm artillery, which would be a further development of a number of innovative solutions of project 83. At the direction of N.G. The Kuznetsov General Military School prepared a preliminary design specification for the design of a similar ship (project 82) with the same composition of the Civil Code artillery, which was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in mid-May 1941. In accordance with this OTZ, the purpose of the ship was to solve the following main tasks: combat with heavy cruisers armed with 203-mm artillery, destruction of enemy light cruisers, support for the actions of friendly light cruisers, laying active minefields, suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for landings, actions on enemy communications.

On the basis of the approved task, the Design Bureau of the Scientific and Technical Committee (STC) of the Navy worked out three options for the main TTE of the ship: according to the OTZ of the GMSh with a displacement of about 25,000 tons; with reduced requirements for armor and speed - about 18,000 tons, according to the proposals of the Design Bureau of the NTK - about 20,000 tons. Based on the results of the study, the NTK reported to the Navy Commander-in-Chief his thoughts on the advisability of changing the preliminary task, which noted the inconsistency of the main TFE specified in the OTZ, purpose of the ship and it was proposed to adopt 220-mm artillery as the main caliber for it (which would ensure the superiority of this cruiser over all existing cruisers with 203-mm artillery), increase the number of 100-mm ZKDB guns and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, install instead of machine guns 20-mm machine guns, reduce the number of aircraft, reduce the thickness of the armor, speed and cruising range. Clarification of the requirements of the preliminary OTZ was delayed due to the start of the Great Patriotic War.

Taking into account the experience of military operations at sea during the Second World War and the proposals of the Scientific and Technical Committee in 1943-1945, the OTZ for the design of the Project 82 heavy cruiser was repeatedly changed to clarify the main tasks of the ship, the composition of its weapons, armor, displacement, speed and cruising range.

In the second edition of the OTZ, approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy in September 1943, the purpose of the cruiser determined the solution of the following tasks: imparting stability to the actions of light forces as part of a squadron and during independent operations, actions on enemy communications, ensuring the combat activity of aircraft carriers and joint operations with them as the main large artillery ship, the suppression of medium-caliber coastal batteries with the assistance of the coastal flank of the army and support for the landing.

In this edition of the OTZ, the main caliber was increased to 220 mm, and in addition to the ZKDB (100 mm), a universal one (130 mm) was also provided, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns increased significantly, there were increased requirements for seaworthiness (the use of weapons in rough seas up to nine points). With such an increase in armament, the displacement was limited to 20,000-22,000 tons.

According to the OTZ of 1943, TsKB-17 worked out eight variants of the main TFC of the Project 82 ship until the end of May next year. These studies showed the incompatibility of a number of task requirements (in terms of armament, armor volume, displacement and speed).

In the third edition of the OTZ, approved by N.G. Kuznetsov in November 1944, the designation of the cruiser and the main caliber of artillery were retained according to its second edition, the universal caliber was strengthened due to the exclusion of the ZKDB, the caliber of small anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) was increased to 45 mm and, in addition to it, a second caliber was provided - 23 mm, decreased requirements for unsinkability and speed. With these changes, the displacement of the SRT was limited to 25,000-26,000 tons. In September 1945, the value of the second caliber of the MZA was clarified, which was changed to 25 mm.

At the end of 1946, TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 submitted to the Criminal Code of the Navy the results of the study of four options for the main elements of project 82 for the 1944 OTZ of the year. They were considered on January 13, 1947 by a commission led by Admiral I.S. Yumashev. At this meeting, to the question of the commander of the KBF, Admiral V.F. Tributsa - "in what way is project 69 outdated?" - Reporting on the results of the study, the head of the design bureau of TsNIIVK L.A. Gordon replied: "insufficient anti-aircraft artillery armament, lack of radar armament and unsatisfactory unsinkability (mainly due to the lack of bottom protection)". In his conclusion, after discussing the developments, Yumashev noted that "for such a large ship with relatively strong protection, the main caliber of 220 mm artillery is certainly small."

By the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 17, 1947, N.G. Kuznetsov was removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Admiral I.S. was appointed in his place. Yumashev, before that commander of the Pacific Fleet. Therefore, further consideration of the design issues of the heavy cruiser of project 82 and the adoption of decisions on them took place without Kuznetsov.

At the end of January 1947, the issues of creating cruisers for the Soviet Navy were considered at a special meeting on military shipbuilding in the Kremlin with the participation of I.V. Stalin, where he expressed the wish to have 305-mm main artillery on them. Following the meeting, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of January 28, 1947, the ministries of the Armed Forces (MVS) and the shipbuilding industry (SME) were instructed to work out a number of options for project 82 with 305-mm and 220-mm main artillery artillery and submit them to the government for consideration within two months.

In pursuance of this order, in early February of the same year, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Yumashev approved the OTZ to study these options. The assignment for the development of options for project 82 with a 305-mm main battery, the purpose of the ship was determined by solving the following tasks: giving combat stability light forces acting as part of maneuverable formations; destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203-mm and 152-mm artillery in sea ​​battle; inflicting powerful artillery strikes on especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts (both in independent operations and in interaction with the coastal flank of friendly troops and landings).

When developing these options, it was necessary to consider different compositions of artillery of the main caliber (8-12 305-mm guns in two- or three-gun turret mounts) and universal (130-mm or 152-mm guns in two-gun turret mounts), with the same composition of the MZA (45 -mm and 25mm machine guns). In terms of aviation armament, it was necessary to consider two options: the first with four ejection fighters-reconnaissance-spotters (with storage of two of them in the hangar) and two rotary catapults, the second - without aircraft based on the ship. Full speed was set at least 32 knots (option - 33 knots), cruising range - 6000 miles at an economic speed of 18 knots, ensuring the use of weapons in a sea state of 7–8 points.

The OTZ requirements for the development of Project 82 variants with 220-mm artillery differed from the 1944 assignment. The main caliber ammunition was reduced from 170 to 125 rounds per barrel, the number of 130-mm universal (long-range anti-aircraft) guns - from sixteen to twelve, the ammunition of 45-mm machine guns from 1500 to 1000 rounds per barrel. The number of 25-mm machine guns increased from twenty to thirty-two, and their ammunition was reduced from 3,000 to 2,500 rounds per barrel.

In the middle of the same month, by order of the SME, L.V. was appointed acting chief designer of project 82. Dikovich (before that - the head of the hull department of TsKB-17, who had extensive experience working on light cruisers of projects 26, 26-bis and 68, heavy cruisers of project 69 and battleships of project 23, head of design studies for project 82).

According to these OTZs, the TsNIIVK Design Bureau developed and in March 1947 submitted to the Navy Criminal Code eight variants of a ship with a displacement of 25,300 to 47,800 tons, and TsKB-17 in April of the same year presented 14 variants of a ship with a displacement in the same limits. Based on the results of their development, TsNIIVK prepared a TTZ project for the design of a heavy cruiser.

At the same time, in order to ensure the study of TsNIIVK and TsKB-17 on the instructions of the Artillery Directorate of the Navy, TsKB-34 of the Ministry of Armaments resumed work on the creation of a 305-mm naval artillery turret, interrupted with the start of World War II.

According to the technical design of the turret MK-15 with the swinging part of the B-50 for project 69, with a barrel length of 54 calibers, they could provide an initial projectile velocity of 900 m / s and a firing range of 257 kbt. On the new 305-mm installations, it was supposed to introduce the achievements of technical progress of that time: remote control of the guidance of towers and barrels and radar fire control, increase fire safety and survivability, reduce by 25 people (approximately 30%) the number of personnel serving the installation.

At the end of March 1947, Deputy Minister of Armaments V.M. initial speed projectile 950 m / s and a maximum firing range of up to 290 kbt.

Of the variants of project 82 worked out by the Navy OTZ in August 1947, the ministers of the Armed Forces, shipbuilding industry and armaments (respectively N.A. Bulganin, A.A. Goreglyad and D.F. Ustinov) presented three options for consideration by the government: two with 305 -mm and one with 220-mm main guns.

In their report to Stalin, it was noted that the presentation of the first two versions of the ship (with the same armament and different thicknesses of the armor of the main side belt) is explained by the difference in the positions of the MVS and SMEs in terms of the optimal thickness of the armor.

The MVS recommended for approval for further design option I with a thickness of 200 mm armor, which provides protection for the main vital parts of the Project 82 ship from 203 mm enemy shells from a distance of 70 kbt and a greater degree of freedom of maneuvering in battle, which was its important tactical advantage. The SME proposed to accept option II with a corresponding reduction in displacement and an increase in full speed, since the 305-mm main caliber artillery allows the Project 82 ship to successfully fight enemy heavy cruisers with 203-mm artillery at long distances, and provided with a 150-mm armor belt the protection of the ship from such shells from a distance of 85 kbt is sufficient.

Option III (cruiser with 220-mm artillery) was seriously inferior to options I and II in terms of fire power and combat survivability. Its advantages over them were only a higher (by 1.5 knots) full speed and a lower (25%) displacement. Such a ship could quite successfully fight cruisers with 203-mm artillery. However, a ship with 305-mm artillery was capable of not only destroying well-known enemy cruisers, but also successfully fighting stronger ships, the appearance of which in foreign fleets was not excluded at that time. Such an advantage in terms of fire power and freedom of maneuvering in battle fully justified the increase in displacement by 10,000 tons and the loss of 1.5 knots of speed.

1 - steering and tiller compartments; 2-smoke equipment; 3 - placement of mechanisms of mooring capstans; 4 - team premises; 5 - club; 6 - power plant No. 4; 7 - 305-mm three-gun turret SM-31; 8 - wardroom for midshipmen and chief foremen; 9 - quadruple 45 mm automatic anti-aircraft gun SM-20-ZIF; 10 - cellar 45-mm ammunition; 11 - spare command post; 12 - AP radar "Fut-B"; 13 - AP radar "Salp"; 14 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 15 - operational felling; 16 - cabin and camping cabin of the flagship; 17 - stabilized pickup post SPN-500-82; 18 - department of auxiliary boilers; 19 - quadruple 25-mm AU BL-120; 20 - shower officers; 21 - navigational cabin and aggregate radars "Neptune" and "Nord"; 22 - AP radar "Fut-N"; 23 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 24 - KDP SM-28; 25 - air defense post; 26 - AP radar "Neptune"; 27 - observation posts for submarines; 28 - main command post; 29 - combat information post; 30 - flagship salon; 31 - 130-mm two-gun AU BL-109A; 32 - ship commander's office; 33 - mechanical workshop; 34 - placement of mechanisms for anchor and mooring capstans; 35 - trim compartment; 36 - chain box; 37 - hydroacoustic station "Hercules"; 38 - provisional pantries; 39 - baffle of the sump pump; 40 - room for refrigeration machines; 41 - room for diesel generators; 42 - power plant No. 1.43 - cellar of 305-mm shells; 44 - cellar 305-mm charges; 45 - cellar 130-mm ammunition; 46 - bow central artillery post; 47 - receiving radio center; 48 - post of energy and survivability (PEZH); 49 - wardroom for officers; 50 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 2; 51 - gyropost; 52 - central navigation post; 53 - boiler room; 54 - engine room; 55 - operating room; 56 - room for turbogenerators and power plant No. 3; 57 - baffle of the evaporation plant; 58 - team bath; 59 - corridor of electrical wires; 60 - empty compartments; 61 - corridor systems; 62 - drinking water tank; 63 - wash water tank; 64 - spare post of energy and survivability; 65 - cellar of small arms ammunition; 66 - cellar of training ammunition; 67 - ship workshops. A - longitudinal section; B - I platform; B - II platform

During the next consideration by the government of issues on the heavy cruiser of project 82, which took place only in March 1948, Stalin approved for further design the variant recommended by the MVS with 305-mm artillery, 200-mm main armor belt, standard displacement of 40,000 tons and a full speed of 32 uz. He instructed to speed up the creation of such cruisers and subsequently systematically personally controlled the progress of their design and construction. After choosing the ship option, the TTZ project prepared in 1947 for its development was corrected by the Navy and agreed with the SME, and then, in April 1948, with a draft government decree on its approval, it was submitted to the Council of Ministers. By a decree of August 31 of the same year on the design and construction of the lead heavy cruiser of project 82, this TTZ was approved. L.V. was approved as the chief designer of this project. Dikovich.

The TsKB-17 draft design was developed from the end of 1947 and submitted to the Navy and SMEs in March 1949 in four versions, which differed in the placement of artillery of the UK and MZA, as well as the composition (in terms of the number and steam output of the main boilers) and the location of the power plant.

The L-3-6 variant had a rhombic placement of 130-mm BL-110 installations, 12 boilers at 80 t / h in four KOs, two MOs. In the B-3-8 variant, four UK installations were placed on each side, and 12 boilers of the same steam capacity were placed in six KOs. Option L-2-4 had a rhombic placement of BL-110, four MKOs (two boilers for 130 t / h and one GTZA in each). In the L-2-6 variant (which the bureau and the customer recommended for technical design), the placement of universal-caliber artillery and power plant was similar to the L-3-6 variant, but each of the KOs housed two main boilers (instead of three) for 130 tons / h.

L.V. Dikovich, chief designer of the Project 82 heavy cruiser

Taking into account the tight deadlines for the creation of heavy cruisers of project 82 (the technical project had to be completed at the end of 1949 to ensure the start of construction of two ships in the 3rd quarter of the next year), TsKB-17 began technical design in April 1949. However, in the autumn, when the Kremlin considered the results of the development of the submitted by the Navy and SMEs for approval draft design, I.V. Stalin unexpectedly asked the chief designer Dikovich a question: “Is it possible to increase the speed of the ship so that our heavy cruiser can catch up and destroy the enemy’s ship, which is less powerful in terms of armament and protection, and get away from any stronger ship in a timely manner?”

Such a wish of the “leader of the peoples” was taken as an indication to change the TTZ, approved by the government just a year ago. As a result, the preliminary design developed by TsKB-17 was not approved, and in the protocol of its consideration it was noted that the ship had too much displacement and insufficient speed.

Heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", design view

After this meeting, the bureau began an accelerated development of the preliminary stage of the technical design (with the selection of new main dimensions and the processing of general layout drawings), which was completed in December 1949. Ensuring a full speed of 35 knots required an increase in the power of the power plant by almost 30% (with the installation of an additional number of main boilers and the development of new GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp). To solve the large-scale task of creating a new, unique power plant, the teams of the Special Design Bureau for Boiler Building (Head and Chief Designer GA. Hasanov), the design bureau of the Kharkov Turbine Generator were involved. Nevsky Machine-Building and Kirov Plants. To compensate for the increase in the mass of the power plant and the specified reduction in the displacement of the ship, it was necessary to reduce the number of 130-mm and 45-mm gun mounts, as well as develop and implement a number of other measures.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", view of the propeller group

Due to the large overload of TsKB-17 (where, simultaneously with the development of project 82, a significant amount of work was carried out to complete the tests of five light cruisers of project 68K and deploy large-scale construction of new light cruisers of project 68-bis), in October of the same year, it was decided to transfer work on project 82 to the newly created TsKB-16 (head - N.N. Isanin), for which he became the main order. In order to ensure continuity design work and the timely release of design documentation for construction plants, since February 1950, about half of the employees of TsKB-17 were transferred to the new bureau - all those employed in the work on project 82.

In January 1950, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.A. Malyshev. From fragments of his diary published in 1997 in the journal Istochnik, it is known that in early March 1950, in the Kremlin office of I.V. Stalin, a meeting was held on project 82 with the participation of Malyshev, Yumashev and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy P.S. Abankina. Stalin asked the sailors for what purposes they thought to use such a cruiser. After the answer: "to fight the enemy's heavy cruisers," he objected that "we have nothing to get involved in the battle with the enemy's heavy ships. The main task of a heavy cruiser should be different - the fight against enemy light cruisers. It is necessary to increase its speed to 35 knots so that it would panic the light cruisers of the enemy, disperse them and smash them. This cruiser should fly like a swallow, be a pirate, a real bandit. He must be able to escape from the blow of heavy enemy ships.

Then Stalin proposed a number of measures to reduce the displacement of the cruiser. When the sailors began to object to some of them, he made a number of comments on the composition of universal and anti-aircraft artillery, as well as on the ammunition load of artillery of all calibers, noting that it was stupid to put 130-mm anti-aircraft guns on a cruiser with a firing ceiling of 16 km - the enemy would bomb it from heights from 500 to 1500 m, therefore, MZA is needed. At the same time, Stalin also ordered to reduce the number of MZA provided for by the project - "such a ship will always have guards that should protect it."

On the objections of sailors against the reduction of ammunition (with reference to a large number of shells on ships of the US and British navies) Stalin replied: “You don’t blindly copy the Americans and the British, they have different conditions, their ships go far into the ocean, breaking away from their bases. We are not thinking of waging ocean battles, but we will fight near our shores and we do not need to have a large ammunition supply on the ship. In this regard, he also allowed to reduce the cruising range and noted that “it is impossible to create a ship that would have all the advantages. You can have advantages either in speed, or in armor and weapons.

Further, Stalin asked where it was planned to build the lead cruiser. Having received an answer that he was in Leningrad, he said that he would first of all like to have two heavy cruisers on the Black Sea, “where you need to have a large fleet, ten times more than now, and be able to firmly lock the Dardanelles. Secondly, build heavy cruisers for the Baltic.

Taking into account the above remarks by I.V. Stalin on the preliminary design and the results of the development of the preliminary stage of the technical project, presented by the newly formed Naval Ministry (VMM) and SMEs, the Council of Ministers of the USSR, by a decree of March 25, 1950, approved the main elements of the task for the development of technical project 82 with partial changes to the TTZ, approved in August 1948. They concerned an increase in full speed to 35 knots (due to a decrease in the composition of the artillery of the UK and MZA, the amount of ammunition of all calibers, a reduction in displacement to 36,000-36,500 tons, cruising range and autonomy) and allowed the SME without adjusting the preliminary design to proceed with the technical, with its submission for government approval in February 1951. At the same time, SMEs were ordered to start construction of two Project 82 ships at factories No. 444 (formerly No. 198) in Nikolaev and No. 189 in Leningrad in the second quarter of the same year, with their delivery to the Navy in 1954 and 1955, respectively. The decision of the VMM and SSP on the preliminary materials of the technical project 82, related to the choice of the main dimensions and the general location of the ship, was approved in September 1950.

According to the memoirs of the head of the weapons department of TsKB-16 V.I. Efimov, who had to go on long business trips to Moscow three times during the consideration and approval of project 82 in SMEs, VMM and the government, the central office then worked according to a special regime: the ministries started the working day at 9 am, from 19 to 22 h there was a break for rest, then returned to work, where they stayed until 2 or 3 am. During these evening hours, government meetings were held with the participation of Stalin, and it was possible to call in senior officials of ministries, heads of enterprises and chief designers. Chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich repeatedly reported together with the Minister of the shipbuilding industry A.A. Goreglyad (later - with V.A. Malyshev) about the design and construction of these cruisers personally by I.V. Stalin in his office in the Kremlin.

In October 1950, N.N. Isanin and L.V. Dikovich was awarded the title of chief designer of the first (highest) degree, established by a government decree of October 15, 1949.

During the design, a significant amount of research and development work was carried out. The most important of these were: the best option theoretical contours of the ship's hull based on the results of testing the running and seaworthiness of scale models in the experimental pools of the Central Research Institute. acad. A.N. Krylov and TsAGI them. NOT. Zhukovsky, testing the stability of side and deck armor by shooting and blowing up cemented and homogeneous armor plates, choosing the optimal design of the PMZ by blowing up twenty large-scale (1: 5) compartments, studying the impact of “muzzle gas cones” of gun mounts, prototyping of the main premises of the power plant, power compartments , ammunition cellars and main combat posts; theoretical studies various issues related to the use of new technology.

A number of experimental works carried out were distinguished by their special novelty and large volume. Tests of large-scale PKZ compartments by detonation were carried out by an interdepartmental commission chaired by the director of TsNII-45 V.I. Pershina. Based on them, TsKB-16 developed an optimal design that had significant advantages over well-known foreign ones (with the same resistance to explosion energy - 10% less weight).

Major experimental work was also carried out: shooting and undermining armor plates, as a result of which the optimal ship armor scheme was determined, studies of the effect of muzzle gases on personnel and superstructure structures, which made it possible to solve the issue of rational placement of artillery installations and open combat posts.

In December 1950, the technical project 82 was completed and in February of the following year it was submitted for consideration and approval by the VMM and SMEs.

The main co-executors and contractors of TsKB-16 for weapons, mechanisms and equipment did not stop developing their projects and design documentation even during the period of adjusting the elements of the ship. Therefore, already at the beginning of 1951, they were able to transfer the RKD into production. A number of samples of auxiliary mechanisms of the power plant were manufactured and adopted by the MVK, thanks to the combination of the stages of design, production of RKD and pre-production, by the end of 1950.

By government decrees and orders from SMEs, dozens of teams from research institutes, design bureaus and shipbuilding and related industries, including such large enterprises as Izhorsky, Kirovsky, Metallichesky im. Stalin, Bolshevik, Electrosila, Novokramatorsky, Barricades, Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, Kaluga Turbine Plant and many others. M.S. was appointed chief observer of the GUK of the Navy. Mikhailov, who headed the supervision of the Navy during the design and construction of Project 23 battleships before the war.

From the end of 1950, without waiting for the approval of the project, TsKB-16, by decision of the VMM and SMEs, began to issue design documentation to ensure the deadlines set by the government for the start of construction of the KRT of project 82 simultaneously at both construction plants. Based on the results of consideration of the technical design materials, in mid-April 1951, a joint decision was issued by the VMM and SME, in accordance with which the bureau corrected the documents defining the main TFC of the ship. In May of the same year, VMM and SMEs presented them to the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which, by a decree of June 4, 1951, approved the technical project 82, the main TFC of the ship and measures to ensure its construction.

On November 14 of the same year, a government decree was adopted on the construction of a third heavy cruiser at factory No. 402 in Molotovsk.

In accordance with technical project The purpose of the ship was:

Giving combat stability to light forces operating as part of mobile formations both near and far (at sea, in the ocean) from their shores;

Direct cover for especially important convoys at the sea crossing from the actions of enemy cruising forces;

Destruction of enemy cruisers armed with 203 mm and 152 mm artillery in a sea battle;

Delivering powerful artillery strikes against especially important coastal targets in operations against enemy bases and coasts, as in independent operations. missions, as well as in cooperation with the flank of their troops and in support of the landing.

According to the approved project, the heavy cruiser was supposed to have artillery: nine 305-mm main guns in three-gun SM-31 turret mounts (total ammunition - 720 rounds); UK - 12 130-mm in two-gun tower installations BL-109A (2400 rounds); MZA - 24 45 mm in SM-20-ZIF quad assault rifles (19,200 rounds) and 40 25 mm in BL-120 quad assault rifles (48,000 rounds + 2,400 fenders).

The PUS system of the More-82 Group of Companies was provided by the KDP SM-28 (rangefinder base 8 and 10 m) and two firing radar stations(radar) "Volley". The 2nd and 3rd GK towers had "Grot" radio rangefinders. Launchers of the universal caliber "Zenit-82" (three sets) were provided by three SPN-500 with firing radar "Anchor". Three towers of the Criminal Code had radio rangefinders "Stag-B". The fire control of anti-aircraft guns SM-20-ZIF was carried out by three radar systems"Foot-B".

The radio-technical armament included the Guys-2 airborne target detection radar (a place was reserved for the installation of the Vakhta airborne early warning radar), the Rif surface target detection radar, and the Fut-N detection and target designation radar. Funds electronic warfare included the Mast search radar and the Coral jamming radar. Two heat direction finders "Solntse-1p" and a hydroacoustic station (GAS) "Hercules-2" were envisaged.

The main armor belt of the citadel (the length of 57.6% of the length of the ship along the DWL) was made of welded 180-mm homogeneous armor, had an angle of inclination from the vertical of 15 ° and protected the side below the average 70-75-mm main armor deck; the deepening of its lower edge amidships under the waterline was 1.7 m. The traverse bulkheads of the citadel had a thickness of up to 140 (bow) and 125 mm (stern). The upper tween deck was protected by 50 mm side and upper deck armor. The armor of the lower deck in the citadel was 15–20 mm thick. The extremity armor included a 50 mm side belt and the same armor on the middle deck. The walls of the main command post had a thickness of up to 260 mm, the roof - 110 mm; wire protection pipe - 100 mm; frontal armor of the GK towers - 240, their side walls - 225, roofs - 125 mm, the rear wall acting as a counterweight - 400–760 mm (from three plates), barbettes of the GK towers - 200–235 mm. The towers of the Criminal Code and their barbettes were protected by 25 mm armor.

The vertical armor of the citadel provided protection against 203-mm armor-piercing shells from distances of 65-75 kbt, and horizontal - up to 175 kbt. The rest of the vertical and horizontal armor was chosen based on protection against 152-mm high-explosive shells and 500-kg high-explosive bombs dropped from a height of 3000 m.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 81.7 sp. (see aft):

1 - fan room; 2 - midshipman's cabin; 3 - corridor; 4 - 305-mm turret AU SM-31; 5 - modular switchgear; 6 - fan enclosure; 7- room for the team; 8 - KATS-100; 9 - electrical equipment room.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 108 sp. (see aft):

I - boiler room; 2 - equipment for receiving fuel; 3 - corridor; 4 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 5 - aggregate radar "Rif-A"; 6 - vestibule; 7 - flagship cabin; 8 - command post of communications; 9 - main command post; 10 - 45 cm signal spotlight;

II - heat direction finder "Solntse-1P"; 12 - direction finder frame; 13 - VHF antenna of the R-610 radio station; 14 - antenna post (AP) radar "Fakel-MZ"; 15-AP radar "Mast"; 16-APRLS "Fut-N"; 17-APRLS "Fakel-MO"; 18 - AP radar "Rif-A"; 19 - VHF radio antenna R-609; 20 - AP radar "Zalp"; 21 - KDP SM-28; 22 - pelorus; 23 - combat information post; 24 - aggregate radar "Anchor"; 25 - modular radar "Fut-N".

PMZ, covering the vital compartments of the ship (ammunition cellars, main posts, power plant premises) throughout the citadel from undermining a charge of 400–500 kg (in TNT equivalent), consisted of three to four longitudinal bulkheads. Of these, the second (8–25 mm) and third (50 mm) were cylindrical, while the first (8–45 mm) and fourth (15–30 mm) were flat. The volumes between the first (second) and third bulkheads were used for fuel (which, as it was consumed, was replaced by outboard water). To increase the length of the armor protection vertically, additional armor plates 20-100 mm thick were hung on the third (main protective) bulkhead of the PMZ.

Also, for the first time in domestic shipbuilding, these heavy cruisers also provided for a three-layer bottom protection, made along a longitudinal-transverse system throughout the citadel. Its height from the outer skin to the third bottom was 2250 mm. The outer skin was made of armor 20 mm thick, the second bottom had a thickness of 18, and the third - 12–18 mm. The value of the maximum charge, the explosion of which at a distance of 5 m from the bottom had to withstand such protection, was estimated at 500 kg.

The hull of the ship was carried out mainly along the longitudinal framing system with the distance between the frame frames in the area of ​​the citadel up to 1.7 m, at the ends - up to 2.4 m and was divided by the main transverse bulkheads (thickness from 6 to 20 mm), from the bottom to the lower deck , into 23 waterproof compartments. The sectional assembly of the hull from three-dimensional and flat sections, adopted according to the principle technology developed in the project, with the widespread use of welding, significantly reduced the slipway period for the construction of the ship.

A four-shaft power plant (four GTZA with a capacity of 70,000 hp each and 12 main boilers with a steam capacity of 110 t / h each with steam parameters of 66 atm, 460 ° C) for that time could become the most powerful in the world. In the electric power system, for the first time in the domestic practice of shipbuilding, it was planned to use an alternating three-phase current (380 V, 50 Hz), it was supposed to use eight turbogenerators with a capacity of 750 kW each and four diesel generators with a capacity of 1000 kW, located in four power plants.

Developed in 1950 at the Naval General Staff, the tentative project of the staff of this heavy cruiser (1712 people and 27 people of the formation headquarters) provided for the commander of the ship the rank of rear admiral, for the first mate, political officer and commanders of BCH-2 and BCH-5 - captains 1st rank.

The new heavy cruiser, in essence, was a repetition of the pre-war project 69, but at a qualitatively new technical level. Its only foreign analogues were two "large" US Navy cruisers of the "Alaska" type, which entered service in 1944 and were considered unsuccessful ships.

For 1951, it was planned to advance work on the lead ship by 10%. During the year, TsKB-16 handed over to the construction plant about 5 thousand sets of design documentation, which was supposed to ensure the manufacture of 19 thousand tons of hull structures (more than half the mass of the entire ship). However, the supply of metal and armor by the metallurgical enterprises of the country turned out to be irregular, which, together with the failure to meet the deadlines for the reconstruction of slipway "0", delayed the laying of the ship.

By the end of 1951, the main counterparty work was at different stages of execution: from the completion of the development of the design documentation to the delivery finished products and delivery to its construction plant. The manufacture of GK SM-31 turret mounts began, field tests of 130-mm mounts and MZA were carried out, field tests were completed with the firing of armor plates. Debugging of prototypes of the main and auxiliary boilers was carried out. The interdepartmental commission accepted ten head samples of auxiliary mechanisms and heat exchangers, six more were presented for interdepartmental tests, four for factory tests, and the working drawings for the rest of the samples were at the final stage.

In the summer of 1951, N.G. Kuznetsov was recalled by Stalin Far East(where from February 1950 he commanded the 5th Navy) and was appointed Naval Minister instead of Yumashev. After four and a half years of disgrace, N.G. Kuznetsov again had to deal with the creation of a heavy cruiser of project 82.

Project 82 heavy cruiser, cross section of 176 sp. (see in the nose):

1 - aft engine room; 2 - radio communication post; 3 - midshipman's cabin; 4 - galley; 5 - gyropost; 6 - ventilation shaft of the engine room; 7 - post of communication with aviation; 8 - cabin PKB; 9 - AP radar "Coral"; 10, 11 - antennas of the VHF radio station R-610; 12 - AP radar "Fakel-MO"; 13 - AP radar "Fakel-MZ"; 14 - antenna UKVR-609; 15 - AP radar "Guys-2"; 16 -AP radar station "Zalp"; 17 - spare command post; 18 - aggregate radar "Zalp"; 19 - bakery; 20 - aft central and switching post of the main caliber; 21 - fuel tank.

*With an increased supply of provisions and fresh water.

When getting acquainted with the elements of this cruiser and the decisions made in his absence, to the question: “What is the idea of ​​​​such a ship?”, Head of the GUK VMM N.V. Isachenkov replied: “Comrade Stalin said that “this ship should dictate the distance of the battle to the enemy due to its speed.” Summing up the results of the meeting, N.G. Kuznetsov described the cruiser as "a heavy, obscure ship. The end does not seem to justify the means. A very expensive ship ... ".

8 during November - December 1951, 12 bottom sections of the first pyramid of the hull of the head cruiser of project 82 (serial number 0-400, chief builder - M.A. Pudzinsky) were submitted and installed on the upper free part of the slipway "O" of plant No. 444. The rest of the slipway was at that time occupied by the hull of the project 68-bis light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov laid down in February of the same year, which was to be launched at the end of 1952. The laying of the lead ship "Stalingrad" took place on December 31, 1951, it was scheduled to be launched by November 6, 1953.

On September 9, 1952, the second ship (serial number 0-406, chief builder - V.A. Neopikhanov) was laid down on the slipway "A" of plant No. 189, which was given the name "Moskva". A month later, in the northern dock chamber of the slipway workshop of plant No. 402, the assembly of the hull of the third ship (serial number 0-401, chief builder - A.F. Baranov), which had not received a name before the order was canceled, began. According to some reports, this plant received an order for a second ship, the construction of which, however, was not started. The delivery of all three ships was scheduled (according to plan) for 1954–1955.

At the beginning of September 1951, by a joint decision of the SME and VMM, the specifications and drawings of the general arrangement of the technical (contractual) project were approved. Along with the continuation of the development of the design documentation for it, the contractual design for serial ships was adjusted, with changes made according to the experience of building the lead ship, according to joint decisions, as well as according to the results of development and prototype work. In order to take prompt measures at the construction plants in Nikolaev and Molotovsk on issues requiring urgent solutions with the participation of the designers of TsKB-16, branches of the bureau were organized there, performing the functions of architectural supervision and technical assistance.

Despite the systematic control over the construction of heavy cruisers of project 82 and the main counterparty supplies for them by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry V.A. Malysheva, the planned tasks were not fulfilled for them, the backlog from the approved schedule reached several months. The actual technical readiness of the ships on January 1, 1953 was 18.8%, 7.5% and 2.5% (instead of 42.9%, 11.5% and 5.2% according to the plan).

A month after the death of I.V. Stalin, the construction of all three heavy cruisers of project 82, on the basis of a government decree of April 18, 1953 and in accordance with the order of the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering I.I. Nosenko on April 23 of the same year was stopped.

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad" in the exposition of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg

Reporting model of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad"

These works were interrupted at a high degree of readiness of the main equipment for the ships under construction. Contractor work on the manufacture (and partial installation on the lead ship) of weapons was fully completed. power plant, turbo and diesel generator sets, a number of auxiliary mechanisms, heat exchangers, ship devices and equipment, automation systems, devices for various purposes and other technical means.

In June 1953, the Minister of Transport and Heavy Engineering and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy decided to use part of the hull of the unfinished cruiser "Stalingrad", including its citadel, as a full-scale experimental compartment to test fire tests in field conditions for the resistance of the structural (armor and mine) protection of the ship to impact new models of naval weapons, testing their fuses and combat units.

Branch No. 1 of the bureau in Nikolaev was instructed to develop documentation for the formation and equipment of the compartment, its lowering from the slipway and towing to the test site. The work on the experimental compartment was led by K.I. Troshkov (chief designer of project 82 L.V. Dikovich was appointed chief engineer - deputy head of TsKB-16).

In 1954, the compartment was launched, and in 1956-1957 it was tested by shooting with cruise missiles, armor-piercing artillery shells, bombs and torpedoes, without losing buoyancy even in the absence of forces and means of damage control on it, which confirmed the high efficiency provided by the cruiser protection project.

The closest analogue and opponent of the Project 82 heavy cruiser is the American "big cruiser" Alaska, armed with 305-mm main guns

The unfinished hulls of the other two cruisers were cut for scrap on the stocks of factories No. 189 and No. 402. On January 19, 1955, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the manufacture of four 305-mm railway batteries for the coastal defense of the Navy using 12 SM-33 oscillating parts of SM-31 tower installations Project 82 ships with their delivery to the Navy in 1957-1958.

By a government decree of March 19 of the same year “On the use of material assets left over from the termination of the construction of Project 82 ships,” the ministries of transport engineering and shipbuilding industry were instructed to ensure that the reserve for the production of eight GTZA TV-4s was stored at the Kharkov Turbine Generator Plant, and at plants No. 402 and No. 444 - machine and boiler equipment. The Ministry of Defense Industry was instructed to transfer to the Ministry of Defense 12 oscillating parts 2M-109, manufactured by the Bolshevik plant for the gun mounts BL-109A of the lead ship.

The work on the creation of the latest heavy cruisers, although, due to objective circumstances, did not end with the expected results, they were very interesting and significant, given the extremely short time frame for the creation of Project 82 ships. This was voiced in the assessment of the work of TsKB-16 and its main co-executors from the government.

At the end of 1953, the bureau received a special cash prize for a significant contribution to solving technical problems in the design and construction of heavy cruisers, performing a significant amount of development work, and timely provision of working design documentation of all three construction plants and providing them with effective assistance in resolving issues that arose during the construction of Project 82 ships. The design and construction of these ships demonstrated the high scientific and technical potential of our country, which further ensured the successful solution of a number of new and wider scale tasks.

The citadel of the heavy cruiser "Stalingrad", turned into an experimental target compartment for testing new types of weapons. In May 1955, a 150-meter compartment was thrown aground during a storm at the entrance to the Sevastopol Bay. He managed to be removed from the stones only in July 1956.

It should be noted that the Project 82 heavy cruisers were the only and last heavy artillery ships in the world laid down after the end of World War II. In the United States in 1946-1949, only five heavy cruisers with 203-mm main gun artillery (total displacement up to 21,500 tons) launched during the war years were completed, and two “large” heavy cruisers of the Alaska type built in 1944 ”(with 305-mm main gun) have been mothballed since 1947 and were scrapped by the beginning of the 1960s.

Cruiser (Dutch kruiser from kruisen - cruising, sailing along a certain route; pl. cruisers or cruisers) - a class of combat surface ships capable of performing tasks independently of the main fleet, among which may be the fight against light fleet forces and enemy merchant ships , defense of formations of warships and convoys of ships, fire support of the coastal flanks of the ground forces and ensuring the landing of amphibious assault forces, laying minefields and others.

Since the second half of the 20th century, the trend towards the enlargement of combat formations to provide protection from enemy aircraft and the specialization of ships to perform specific tasks has led to the practical disappearance of general-purpose ships, such as cruisers, from the fleets of many countries. Only the Russian, US, and Peruvian navies currently use them.

Until the end of the 1950s. cruisers were the most developed and relatively numerous class of ships. Artillery has always been their main force. The creation of rocket weapons expanded the tasks facing the cruisers. Many cruisers in most countries of the world have undergone major modernization. Instead of guns they got missile systems, modern radio-electronic and hydroacoustic equipment. Thus, a new type of cruisers appeared - missile cruisers, which began to carry out their service side by side with artillery cruisers.

Project 68-bis artillery cruiser, according to NATO classification - Sverdlov class

Artillery cruisers subdivided into heavy and light - depending on the caliber of the main artillery. The era of these ships is gradually fading into the past. Since the early 1960s not a single new artillery cruiser was launched, and those that are are all in reserve. Missile cruisers, or URO cruisers, are also divided into heavy and light, but depending on the displacement.
Usually cruisers with a displacement of 15,000-28,000 tons are classified as heavy, and ships with a displacement of 5,000-12,000 tons are classified as light. The main task of URO cruisers is the combat protection of large groupings of ships, including aircraft carrier formations. Depending on weapons missile cruisers can successfully fight submarines, surface ships and enemy aircraft.

Typical URO cruisers became American ships of the Lehi and Velknap type built in the 1960s. They have a displacement of 7800-7900 tons and a top speed of 32 knots. Their armament consists of two launchers of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, two twin launchers of Terrier anti-aircraft missiles and an Asrok anti-submarine complex.

A special place among surface ships is occupied by URO nuclear cruisers. The first American cruiser of this type, Long Beach, with a displacement of 17,100 tons, entered service in 1961. The use of a nuclear reactor removed restrictions on cruising range and made it possible to design superstructures in a new way.
"Long Witch" - a cruiser on which there is no armor, but it is literally stuffed with all kinds of electronics that allow you to detect the enemy for many kilometers. However, despite a number of undoubted advantages, the Americans intend to abandon the further construction of ships of this type due to their high cost and complexity.

Further development of the URO nuclear cruisers was expressed in the creation of the Bainbridge ships (displacement 8590 tons) and Trakstan (9200 tons). These ships have the same fore and aft design, an extended forecastle and a high freeboard, which reduces the ship's flooding. For better protection against weapons of mass destruction, most of the deck mechanisms and devices are removed below the deck and inside the superstructures.

In the mid 1970s. The same-type nuclear missile cruisers "California" and "South Carolina" entered service. Their total displacement is 11,000 tons, and maximum speed 36 knots. From 1976 to 1980, the US Navy included nuclear-powered cruisers URO "Virginia", similar in appearance and performance with California-class cruisers.

Missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay and helicopter Skorsky MH-60S Sea Hawk. 2008

In 1983, the new cruiser URO "Ticonderoga" (with a displacement of 9600 tons) entered the water - the lead ship in a series of 26 units. Power plant with a capacity of 80,000 liters. With. provides a full speed of 30 knots. A feature of Ticonderoga is an unusual deck covering with light honeycomb panels made of non-combustible materials.
The cruiser has powerful weapons: a new Aegis anti-aircraft system, two Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers, a pair of Standard anti-aircraft missiles and Asrok anti-submarine missiles, artillery of two 127-mm and two 20-mm guns, and also two triple-tube torpedo tubes. This long list is completed by a pair of anti-submarine helicopters. Such an abundance of weapons led to an overload of the cruiser, which is why the speed and stability of the vessel leave much to be desired. Despite this, by the mid-1990s 25 more such ships entered service, with the last 17 armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The most powerful strike weapons (16 Bazalt anti-ship missiles, 104 Fort and Osa anti-aircraft missiles) are carried on board by Russian Slava-class cruisers, which is why they were even dubbed "aircraft carrier killers." The last of them - "Chervona Ukraine" - replenished the Pacific Fleet in February 1990. There is no nuclear power on the "Slava": it is replaced by a conventional gas turbine installation. The only nuclear-powered ships in the composition Russian Navy- These are heavy cruisers of the Kirov type (displacement 25,860 tons, length 250.1 m, speed up to 32 knots), the last of which, Petr Veliky, was launched in 1989.

The appearance in the German fleet of heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper type is in itself an interesting story, showing how bizarre naval doctrines can change, sometimes following a logic that is not entirely clear at first glance. Many features of ships of this type, both successful and unsuccessful, were the result not of the achievements or mistakes of the designers, but of the requirements of maritime policy.

Immediately before and during the First World War, the development of German cruisers strictly followed a single line. After the transition to 150-mm caliber, each next type was only a slight improvement on the previous one; the growth in displacement and speed was slow, and the armament of seven to eight guns remained constant. Displacement did not exceed moderate 5-6 thousand tons; Seaworthiness was also close. This made it possible, with a relatively modest number of units, to maintain the homogeneity of cruiser units consisting of new ships. Moreover, each of them could argue in battle with any of the British rivals of the same class. After the defeat of Germany, the situation in the shipbuilding sense has changed little. Limiting the displacement of cruisers under the Versailles Peace Treaty to a 6,000-ton limit forced the designers to retain 150-mm artillery, placed, however, in modern tower installations.

The development of the class of cruisers in the victorious countries went completely differently. At the end of the war, Great Britain created ships with 190-mm artillery specifically for the fight against German light cruisers, named after sailors and politicians of the Queen Elizabeth era. Their displacement, approaching almost 10 thousand tons, became the basis for the Washington restrictions in this class. Britain, wishing to keep all 5 combat units that clearly stood out from the rest of the mass of both its own and foreign light cruisers, insisted on its own, but at the same time fell into a trap set by itself. All the major maritime powers, and primarily the United States, began building ships with exactly the maximum permitted parameters: a standard displacement of 10,000 tons (“long” English tons of 1016 kg), armed with 8-inch (203-mm) artillery and possessing high speed stroke - as a rule, for 32 knots. At the same time, a whole fleet of early English light cruisers turned out to be powerless in the face of the "new generation", which left them no chance in battle.

However, not everything was in order with the new class. With no experience in building large, fast units with powerful 203 mm turret artillery but limited displacement, designers from all countries initially suffered one of the most brutal setbacks in the history of military shipbuilding. The first series of "Washington" cruisers shone with an almost complete lack of protection, not only from their own guns, but also from 6-inch guns, and in some cases even from destroyer guns! Only a few years later, it was possible to find the right balance of combat elements and technical solutions, and the next generation of "Washingtonians", built in the second half of the 1930s, showed many examples of powerful warships, not only well armed, but also solidly protected.

Officially, Germany, fettered by the Versailles agreement, did not take any part in all the "cruising races". But it was she who dealt the new class, perhaps, the most crushing blow. The "pocket battleships", which entered service simultaneously with the first of the "Washington" cruisers, were so superior to them in battle that they served as one of the reasons for the appearance of more balanced projects of the second generation of "Washingtonians". The Deutschlands, with their six 283-mm guns, could not do only one thing with their opponents - to catch up with them, developing a maximum of 27–28 knots. But this was not required from the ships of the country, which put the raider actions of individual strong units at the head of its naval doctrine.

It would seem that such a successful solution should have been further developed - at least in the plans. However, even before Hitler came to power, during the Weimar Republic, German naval leaders (all who came out of the depths of the Kaiser's fleet) dreamed of a "big fleet". And the next "High Seas Fleet" could not do without all types of warships, including heavy cruisers that have become almost mandatory. Diesel "pickpockets" did not fit into the battle formations of future squadrons, not having sufficient speed for reconnaissance and covering their light forces, and their huge range would remain unclaimed.

Initially, the abolition of the Versailles restrictions seemed unlikely, and appetites did not extend beyond the projects of all the same 6-inch ships. Moreover, England and other major maritime powers, dissatisfied with their "Washington" cruisers, made a sharp turn towards just such units. However, after 1933, the German Naval Staff and its main policy maker, Admiral Raeder, turned more decisively to the idea of ​​a heavy cruiser.

At the very beginning of 1934, preliminary design requirements for the new ship were developed at the Naval Staff. It was assumed that he would be able to compete in battle with all potential opponents (among which the very successful, albeit single, French Algeri, which was under construction at that time), stood out, but would have a speed that would allow him to get away from those who were also on the stocks French fast battleships (sometimes classified as battlecruisers) "Dunkirk" and "Strasbourg", which promised to be the most feared hunters of "pocket battleships" and not fast enough heavy cruisers. In addition, the new German ship was intended for traditional raiding operations in the ocean.

Now German engineers are faced with the same problem that plagued their colleagues in other countries a few years ago. Eight 203-mm guns, a speed of 32 knots and a fuel reserve of 12,000 miles with a 15-knot course had to be accommodated in all the same 9000-10,000 tons. The task turned out to be more than difficult, since the Germans, who traditionally preferred well-protected ships, wanted to have armor , at least equivalent to the 120 mm belt and 80 mm deck of the French Algeri.

It soon became clear that miracles do not happen, and some combat elements would have to be sacrificed. Initially, they turned to reducing the caliber of guns. But the installation of 12 150 mm guns instead of 8 203 mm gave weight savings of 550 tons at best, while a heavy cruiser immediately ceased to be “heavy”, noticeably losing in armor penetration. Then they tried to find a solution in an intermediate, 190-mm caliber. In May 1934, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Raeder, at which the advantages and disadvantages of 190-mm and 203-mm calibers were carefully discussed (and this despite the fact that both calibers were completely prohibited under the terms of Versailles!). The chairman himself put an end to the disputes, noting that the savings in weight on 8 guns and their ammunition would be less than 100 tons with a smaller caliber, while the future belongs precisely to eight-inch guns.

After this meeting, the pace of development noticeably accelerated, although with a careful approach, German designers became more and more convinced of what their colleagues from other countries had already come to terms with: the inability to combine the desired protection, speed and armament within 10 thousand tons. Formally, Germany did not was subject to the limitations of the Washington Conference, but only insofar as it was squeezed by the much more rigid framework of Versailles, therefore, in its “fantasies” it could exceed the 10,000th limit with the same ease as the 6,000th, but at the same time the question of cost arose. In addition, Hitler, who had just come to power, wanted to look respectable, and at one time his plans even included Germany joining the international maritime agreements, Washington and London, but only as a full member. Due to such a complex set of circumstances, the project officially remained “10,000 tons”, and initially this limit was not supposed to be exceeded.