Jeanne d'Arc (armored cruiser). Jeanne d'Arc (armored cruiser) Jeanne d'Arc armored cruiser

13.03.2020

Story

Having studied the unsuccessful experience of trying to create a "small and cheap" armored cruiser, the French came to the conclusion that armored cruisers of small size, like the Amiral Charne and Potuo, could not be adequately effective. With limited displacement, belt armor took too much weight, forcing either to make the armor belt thin and ineffective (as on the Potuo) or to limit speed and armament (as on the Amiral Sharne). Based on these experiences, French shipbuilders decided that only large armored cruisers could be effective in their intended role as ocean raiders.

In 1896, based on the accumulated experience and the latest technical solutions, a new armored cruiser was laid at the military shipyard in Toulon, which was to become the prototype for all subsequent series of such ships. The main task of the ship was seen primarily as cruising operations; the French fleet, traditionally perceiving the British as its main rival, planned to neutralize the superiority of Britain in heavy ships by deploying a large-scale raider campaign against British shipping. Based on this doctrine, the new French armored cruiser had to have high seaworthiness for long-term operations in the ocean, high speed to avoid combat with superior enemy forces, and the most powerful armor so as not to receive critical damage from accidental shell hits.

Design

The armored cruiser Jeanne d'Arc represented a significant step forward in French shipbuilding. On it, the designers abandoned the archaic details that dominated earlier, such as massive, protruding rams, a strong blockage of the sides inward in the upper part, and the deflection of the hull in the center. For the first time in the French cruising fleet, Joan of Arc had an almost straight stem with a small ram at the waterline, high straight sides, and a long forecastle in the bow, which stretched almost to the aft mast.

The total displacement of the ship was about 11,000 tons. Its length exceeded 145 meters, width - 19.4 meters, and draft - 8.1 meters. Striving to achieve high speed and the consequent requirement that a large number boilers led to the Joan of Arc having six chimneys, grouped in two groups of three. In the bow there was a short lightweight combat mast, with a single massive tops; this mast was also a support for the bridge. A light signal mast was located in the stern.

Armament

The main armament of the Joan of Arc consisted of two 194-mm 40-caliber guns of the 1896 model. These guns - improved versions of the guns mounted on previous armored cruisers - were located in two rotating armor turrets, one in the bow and one in the stern of the Jeanne d'Arc. In battle, these guns were supposed to hit the armored parts of enemy ships, conduct linear and retrograde fire at considerable distances during the pursuit / retreat of the cruiser.

Auxiliary armament was represented by fourteen rapid-firing 138-mm 45-caliber guns, model 1893. These guns had a high rate of fire - however, inferior to British counterparts - and were intended to destroy the unarmored parts of enemy ships with high-explosive shells. Eight of these guns were installed on the upper deck of the Joan of Arc, four on each side, on protruding sponsons. Six more were installed, three on each side on the forecastle deck. Seven rapid-firing guns could be aimed at each side (four from the upper deck and three from the forecastle deck), four at the bow and stern, respectively (two from the upper deck and two from the forecastle deck).

The anti-mine armament of the Joan of Arc consisted of sixteen 47-mm Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns. Ten of them stood side by side on the roof of the bow superstructure - five on each side - four more were located on the hinged deck between the pipes, and two stood on the wings of the aft bridge. This armament was supplemented by four 37-mm five-barreled Hotchkiss revolver guns on the top of the combat mast.

Submarine armament was reduced compared to previous armored cruisers and consisted of only two underwater torpedo tubes with a caliber of 450 millimeters. The devices were installed in the center of the hull, one on each side, and fired perpendicular to the course of the cruiser. Also, "Joan of Arc" had a small ram.

Armor protection

Armor protection has been significantly improved compared to the previous armored cruisers of the French ocean fleet. The main armor belt was made of steel hardened using the Harvey method; it stretched the entire length of the ship from stem to stem, its height was 2.4 meters, of which about a meter was under water. Its thickness was 150 millimeters, at the lower - underwater - edge, the belt was thinned to 40 millimeters.

Above the main belt was the upper one, 100 millimeters thick in the central part, and thinning to 40 millimeters at the extremities. The upper belt also stretched the entire length of the ship; its height was 1.8 meters, excluding the bow - where the belt rose to the level of the forecastle deck, completely protecting the bow of the cruiser.

The convex armored deck was completely submerged; its central part passed at the level of the waterline, and had a thickness of 35 millimeters. On the bevels connected to the lower edge of the armor belt, the deck thickened up to 65 millimeters. A flat deck 15 millimeters thick rested on the edges of the upper belt, which played the role of "cocking"; the armor-piercing projectile that hit her was cocked and fired prematurely. The space between decks was divided into many small compartments used to store coal, supplies, or filled with pulp.

The armored turrets were protected from the rear by 160 mm thick plates and from the front by 120 mm. This arrangement of armor plates was chosen for reasons of balancing the weight of the new long-barreled guns. Rapid-fire guns were behind 75 mm shields.

Power point

Joan of Arc was a three-shaft cruiser; three vertical triple expansion machines were powered by three propellers. Steam was provided by forty-eight Norman-Sigodi water-tube boilers, eight boilers in six boiler rooms, with a design capacity of 28,500 liters. With. The cruiser had six pipes and a lot of fans on the upper deck, necessary for the removal / supply of air to power plants. A few years later, the boilers were replaced by thirty-six du Temple boilers.

The cruiser's design speed was 23 knots; however, on the measured mile, Joan of Arc did not achieve more than 21.8 knots despite the developed 33,000 horsepower. In addition, the cruiser proved to be insufficiently maneuverable - at full speed, the turning circle was almost 2000 meters. On the other hand, the cruiser had an excellent range - the coal supply was enough for 13,500 miles of a 10-knot course.

Service

Project evaluation

The armored cruiser Joan of Arc became an important milestone in the history of French shipbuilding, defining the classic type of French armored cruiser - a high-sided ocean raider with a full armor belt and a powerful rapid-fire battery. On it, French engineers abandoned the previously dominant design concepts, and made a significant leap in armor protection and seaworthiness.

For its time, "Joan of Arc" organically combined excellent seaworthiness with powerful armor. Her main armor belt, together with the armored deck slopes, provided adequate protection against the heavy guns of the British first rank cruisers at most combat ranges; the thin upper belt was capable of negating the effectiveness of the British 120 mm and 152 mm rapid fire guns. The use of Harvey's armor made it possible to strengthen the protection without increasing its thickness.

The combat capabilities of the Joan of Arc provided her with a confident advantage over the first-rank British armored cruisers. The upper belt of the French cruiser nullified the effectiveness of the main armament of the British ships - the battery of rapid-fire guns - while the vital parts of the cruiser were adequately protected from the fire of the few British heavy guns [ ] .

However, this innovative ship was not without flaws. Its speed, despite all efforts, turned out to be below the design one, which did not give Joan of Arc the desired superiority in speed over British ships. The armament of the cruiser looked insufficient compared to the auxiliary battery of 164-mm guns on previous cruisers. Finally, the maneuverability of the cruiser turned out to be beyond criticism (which, however, was not very relevant for a ship not intended for operations as part of a squadron). Subsequent projects of French armored cruisers were developed in an effort to offset these shortcomings [ ] .

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Jeanne d'Arc

Armored cruiser Jeanne d'Arc
Service:	France France
Vessel class and type	armored cruiser
Launched into the water	June 8, 1899
Commissioned	1902
Withdrawn from the Navy	1929
Status	Sold for scrap
Main characteristics
Displacement	11,270 tons
Length	145.38 m
Width	19.4 m
Draft	8.1 m
Booking	Harvey armor belt - 40…150 mm, deck - 18 + 65 mm (on bevels - 35 mm), towers - 120 ... 160 mm, barbettes - 50 ... 140 mm, gun shields - 75 mm, conning tower - 150 mm
Engines	3 steam engines triple expansion, 48 steam boilers
Power	33 000 l. With.(24.3 M Tue)
mover	3 screws
travel speed	21,8 node (40,4 km/h)
cruising range	13,500 nautical miles at 10 knots
Crew	626-651 people
Armament
Artillery	2×1 - 194 mm , 14×1 - 138 mm , 16×1 - 47mm , 6 × 37 mm mitrailleuse
Mine and torpedo armament	Two single-pipe 450 mm torpedo tubes

Story

After studying the unsuccessful experience of trying to create a "small and cheap" armored cruiser, the French came to the conclusion that small armored cruisers like the Amiral Charne and Potuo could not be adequately effective. With limited displacement, belt armor took too much weight, forcing either to make the armor belt thin and ineffective (as on the Potuo) or to limit speed and armament (as on the Amiral Sharne). Based on these experiences, French shipbuilders decided that only large armored cruisers could be effective in their intended role as ocean raiders.

Design

The total displacement of the ship was about 11,000 tons. Its length exceeded 145 meters, width - 19.4 meters, and draft - 8.1 meters. The desire to achieve high speed and the resulting requirement for a large number of boilers led to the Jeanne d'Arc having six chimneys grouped in two groups of three. In the bow there was a short lightweight combat mast, with a single massive tops; this mast was also a support for the bridge. A light signal mast was located in the stern.

Armament

Auxiliary weapons were represented by fourteen rapid-fire 138-mm 45-caliber guns of the 1893 model of the year. These guns had a high rate of fire - however, inferior to British counterparts - and were intended to destroy the unarmored parts of enemy ships with high-explosive shells. Eight of these guns were installed on the upper deck of the Joan of Arc, four on each side, on protruding sponsons. Six more were installed, three on each side on the forecastle deck. Seven rapid-firing guns could be aimed at each side (four from the upper deck and three from the forecastle deck), four at the bow and stern, respectively (two from the upper deck and two from the forecastle deck).

Armor protection

Power point

Joan of Arc was a three-shaft cruiser; three vertical triple expansion machines were powered by three propellers. Steam was provided by forty-eight Norman-Sigodi water-tube boilers, eight boilers in six boiler rooms, with a design capacity of 28,500 liters. With. The cruiser had six pipes and many fans on the upper deck, necessary for the removal / supply of air to the power plants. A few years later, the boilers were replaced by thirty-six du Temple boilers.

Service

Project evaluation

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Notes

Literature

Nenakhov Yu. Yu. Encyclopedia of cruisers 1860-1910. - M: AST, 2006. - ISBN 5-17-030194-4.
Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1860-1905. - London: Conway Maritime Press, 1979. - ISBN 0-85177-133-5.



type of " Amiral Charnet »

type of " Montcalm »

type of " Dupleix »

type of " Gluar »

type of " Leon Gambetta »

type of " Waldeck-Rousseau »

Individual projects

An excerpt characterizing Joan of Arc (armored cruiser)

General Sorbier must be ready at the first order to take out with all the howitzers of the guards artillery against one or another fortification.
In continuation of the cannonade, Prince Poniatowski will go to the village, into the forest and bypass the enemy position.
General Kompan will move through the forest to take the first fortification.
Upon entering the battle in this way, orders will be given according to the actions of the enemy.
The cannonade on the left flank will begin as soon as the cannonade of the right wing is heard. The riflemen of Moran's and Viceroy's divisions will open heavy fire upon seeing the right wing attack begin.
The viceroy will take possession of the village [Borodin] and cross his three bridges, following at the same height with the divisions of Moran and Gerard, who, under his leadership, will move towards the redoubt and enter the line with the rest of the army.
All this must be carried out in order (le tout se fera avec ordre et methode), keeping the troops as far as possible in reserve.
In the imperial camp, near Mozhaisk, September 6, 1812.
This disposition, very vaguely and confusedly written - if you allow yourself to treat his orders without religious horror at the genius of Napoleon - contained four points - four orders. None of these orders could be and was not executed.
The disposition says, firstly: that the batteries arranged at the place chosen by Napoleon with the guns of Pernetti and Fouche, having aligned with them, a total of one hundred and two guns, open fire and bombard the Russian flashes and redoubt with shells. This could not be done, since the shells did not reach the Russian works from the places appointed by Napoleon, and these one hundred and two guns fired at empty until the nearest commander, contrary to Napoleon's order, pushed them forward.
The second order was that Poniatowski, heading for the village into the forest, bypassed the left wing of the Russians. This could not be and was not done because Poniatowski, heading for the village into the forest, met Tuchkov blocking his way there and could not and did not bypass the Russian position.
Third order: General Kompan will move into the forest to take the first fortification. Compana's division did not capture the first fortification, but was repulsed, because, leaving the forest, it had to be built under grapeshot fire, which Napoleon did not know.
Fourth: The Viceroy will take possession of the village (Borodin) and cross his three bridges, following at the same height with the divisions of Maran and Friant (of which it is not said where and when they will move), which, under his leadership, will go to the redoubt and enter the line with other troops.
As far as one can understand - if not from the stupid period of this, then from those attempts that were made by the Viceroy to fulfill the orders given to him - he was to move through Borodino on the left to the redoubt, while the divisions of Moran and Friant were to move simultaneously from the front.
All this, as well as other points of the disposition, was not and could not be executed. Having passed Borodino, the viceroy was repulsed on Kolocha and could not go further; the divisions of Moran and Friant did not take the redoubt, but were repulsed, and the redoubt was captured by cavalry at the end of the battle (probably an unforeseen and unheard of thing for Napoleon). So, none of the orders of the disposition was and could not be executed. But the disposition says that after entering the battle in this way, orders will be given corresponding to the actions of the enemy, and therefore it might seem that during the battle all the necessary orders will be made by Napoleon; but this was not and could not be because during the whole time of the battle Napoleon was so far away from him that (as it turned out later) he could not know the course of the battle and not a single order of his during the battle could be executed.

Many historians say that the battle of Borodino was not won by the French because Napoleon had a cold, that if he had not had a cold, then his orders before and during the battle would have been even more brilliant, and Russia would have perished, et la face du monde eut ete changee. [and the face of the world would have changed.] For historians who admit that Russia was formed at the behest of one man - Peter the Great, and France from a republic developed into an empire, and French troops went to Russia at the behest of one man - Napoleon, such an argument that Russia remained powerful because Napoleon had a bad cold on the 26th, such reasoning for such historians is inevitably consistent.
If it depended on the will of Napoleon to give or not to give the Battle of Borodino, and it depended on his will to make such or another order, then it is obvious that a runny nose, which had an influence on the manifestation of his will, could be the reason for the salvation of Russia and that therefore the valet who forgot to give Napoleon On the 24th, waterproof boots, was the savior of Russia. On this path of thought, this conclusion is undoubted, just as undoubted as the conclusion that Voltaire, jokingly (without knowing why himself), said that the St. Bartholomew night came from an upset stomach of Charles IX. But for people who do not allow Russia to be formed at the behest of one person - Peter I, and for the French empire to take shape and the war with Russia to begin at the behest of one person - Napoleon, this reasoning not only seems to be wrong, unreasonable, but also contrary to the whole being. human. To the question of what constitutes the cause of historical events, another answer appears, which consists in the fact that the course of world events is predetermined from above, depends on the coincidence of all the wills of the people participating in these events, and that the influence of the Napoleons on the course of these events is only external and fictitious.
Strange as it may seem at first glance, the assumption that the Bartholomew night, the order for which was given by Charles IX, did not happen by his will, but that it only seemed to him that he ordered it to be done, and that the Borodino massacre of eighty thousand people did not happen by the will of Napoleon (despite the fact that he gave orders about the beginning and course of the battle), and that it seemed to him only that he ordered it - strange as this assumption seems, but human dignity, which tells me that each of us, if not more, then in no way less than the great Napoleon, orders us to allow this solution of the issue, and historical research abundantly confirms this assumption.
In the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon neither shot nor killed anyone. All this was done by the soldiers. So he didn't kill people.
The soldiers of the French army went to kill Russian soldiers in the battle of Borodino, not as a result of Napoleon's orders, but own will. The whole army: the French, Italians, Germans, Poles - hungry, ragged and exhausted by the campaign - in view of the army blocking Moscow from them, felt that le vin est tire et qu "il faut le boire. [the wine is uncorked and you need to drink it .] If Napoleon now forbade them to fight the Russians, they would have killed him and would have gone to fight the Russians, because it was necessary for them.
When they listened to the order of Napoleon, who presented them with consolation for their injuries and death, the words of posterity that they were in the battle near Moscow, they shouted "Vive l" Empereur! just as they shouted "Vive l" Empereur! at the sight of a picture of a boy piercing the globe with a bilbock stick; just as they would shout "Vive l" Empereur! with any nonsense that they would have been told. There was nothing left for them to do but shout "Vive l" Empereur! and go fight to find food and rest for the winners in Moscow. Therefore, it was not because of Napoleon's orders that they killed their own kind.
And it was not Napoleon who controlled the course of the battle, because nothing from his disposition was executed and during the battle he did not know about what was happening ahead of him. Therefore, the way in which these people killed each other did not happen at the will of Napoleon, but proceeded independently of him, at the will of hundreds of thousands of people who participated in the common cause. It seemed to Napoleon only that the whole thing was happening according to his will. And therefore the question of whether or not Napoleon had a runny nose is of no greater interest to history than the question of the runny nose of the last Furshtat soldier.
Moreover, on August 26, Napoleon's runny nose did not matter, since the testimony of writers that, due to Napoleon's runny nose, his disposition and orders during the battle were not as good as before, are completely unfair.
The disposition written out here was not in the least worse, and even better, than all previous dispositions by which battles were won. The imaginary orders during the battle were also no worse than before, but exactly the same as always. But these dispositions and orders seem only worse than the previous ones, because the battle of Borodino was the first that Napoleon did not win. All the most beautiful and profound dispositions and orders seem very bad, and every learned military man criticizes them with a significant air when the battle is not won over them, and the very bad dispositions and orders seem very good, and serious people in whole volumes prove the merits of bad orders, when the battle is won over them.
The disposition drawn up by Weyrother at the Battle of Austerlitz was a model of perfection in writings of this kind, but it was nevertheless condemned, condemned for its perfection, for being too detailed.
Napoleon in the battle of Borodino performed his job as a representative of power just as well, and even better, than in other battles. He did nothing detrimental to the course of the battle; he leaned towards more prudent opinions; he did not confuse, did not contradict himself, did not get frightened and did not run away from the battlefield, but with his great tact and experience of the war, he calmly and dignifiedly played his role of seeming boss.

Returning from his second preoccupied trip down the line, Napoleon said:
The chess is set, the game will start tomorrow.
Ordering himself a punch and calling Bosse, he began a conversation with him about Paris, about some changes that he intended to make in the maison de l "imperatrice [in the court staff of the empress], surprising the prefect with his memory of all the small details of court relations.
He was interested in trifles, joked about Bosse's love of travel and casually chatted like a famous, confident and knowledgeable cameraman does, while he rolls up his sleeves and puts on an apron, and the patient is tied to a bunk: “It's all in my hands and in the head, clear and definite. When I need to get down to business, I will do it like no other, and now I can joke, and the more I joke and calm, the more you should be sure, calm and surprised at my genius.
Having finished his second glass of punch, Napoleon went to rest before the serious business, which, as it seemed to him, was coming to him the next day.
He was so interested in this task ahead of him that he could not sleep and, despite the runny nose that had worsened from the evening dampness, at three o'clock in the morning, blowing his nose loudly, he went out into the large compartment of the tent. He asked if the Russians had left? He was told that the enemy fires were still in the same places. He nodded his head approvingly.
The duty adjutant entered the tent.

Jeanne d'Arc (fr. Jeanne d "Arc) is a light cruiser of the French Navy during the Second World War. It was originally designed as a training ship for the fleet. The question of creating a new training ship for the training of junior officers of the fleet arose in the mid-1920s,

when the deadlines for decommissioning the armored cruiser Jeanne d'Arc, which had performed this role since 1919 and was scheduled for decommissioning in 1928, were approaching.

Initially, two ways to solve the problem were considered:

1) convert one of the less old armored cruisers into a training one;

2) Purchase one of the modern civilian motor ships and re-equip it. After lengthy consideration, both options were rejected.

All the armored cruisers of the French fleet were already too worn out, and their power plants were completely outdated and could not provide training for engine teams. The re-equipment of a civilian ship required substantial costs with a dubious result. Therefore, it was decided to build a special training ship.

Main characteristics:

Standard displacement 6496 tons, total displacement 8950 tons.
Length 160/170 m.
Width 17.7 m.
Draft 6.3 m.
Reservation of the tower - 25 mm, felling - 25 mm, cellars - 20 mm.
Engines 2 TZA Parsons, 4 steam boilers Penhoët.
Power 32 500 l. With.
Propeller 2 screws.
Travel speed 25 knots.
Cruising range 5200 miles at 11 knots.
Crew 506 people, with cadets - 682 people, in wartime 648 people.

Armament:

Artillery 4 × 2 - 155 mm / 50.
Anti-aircraft artillery 4 × 1 - 75 mm / 50, 2 × 1 - 37 mm / 50, 4 × 2 - 13.2 mm machine guns.
Mine-torpedo armament 2 single-tube torpedo tubes of 550 mm caliber.
Aviation group 1 - 2 seaplanes Loire 130.

Project evaluation

The construction of Joan of Arc marked a new stage in the approach of the French Navy to the training of naval personnel. Instead of obsolete warships that did not meet the new requirements, they preferred to create a modern cruiser-class training ship suitable for use in various missions.
"Jeanne d'Arc" at the time of construction had quite modern weapons and equipment, which was further updated during the upgrades.
Solid size allowed to take a significant number of cadets and make long voyages. The impressive appearance of the ship, which was constantly on campaigns with calls to foreign ports, contributed to the successful "showing the flag".

In terms of purely combat qualities, the Joan of Arc was inferior to contemporary light cruisers, but operating in the colonies, the ship was quite adequate for its tasks, and the weakness of the defense and low speed did not matter much.
During the service on board the cruiser, 4,600 naval officers were trained, and thus the Joan of Arc made a significant contribution to the development of the French fleet.