Such tight deadlines are nothing new, says Kirill Parfyonov, president of the Club of Bank Accountants: “On December 31, one bank received an order to accrue additional reserves by the end of the month.” According to him, reporting is also practiced “urgently on completion”: “Perhaps this is due to the fact that if you accrue quickly and do not let anything else be done, then there will be complete confidence that the bank will not come up. It is likely that the decision has already been made and it is only necessary to back it up with reporting.”
Something like this happened: on July 7, a meeting of the Banking Supervision Committee of the Central Bank (CBN) was held, the result of which was an order to introduce a temporary administration in Yugra represented by the DIA from July 10.
The bank, according to Shilyaev, did everything on time - at 15.05 a report on reserves and a paper version were sent to the Central Bank, in which Yugra announced that the reporting forms would be submitted by 17.00 on July 7: “Before sending the report, we showed it to a working group of employees of the Central Bank, checking the bank. In the letter, we explained that the required forms are generated based on data for the entire bank (with branches in different time zones) on the second business day after the reporting date. Therefore, at 15.00 there can be no reporting for July 7, but we undertake to provide it before 17.00, which was done at about 16.45, we have a note from the bank curator on the paper version.” On that day, electronic reporting was sent to the Central Bank, he added.
Elvira Nabiullina Chairman of the Bank of Russia
Such an aggressive attraction of deposits from the population in financing projects of owners, who, most likely, will not service loans now, we already see it<...>This business model is not curable.
But on Fridays, the regulator has a short day - just before 16.45 - and Yugra did not have time to fulfill the order, representatives of the Central Bank insisted in court. But in this short day, the Central Bank managed a lot, it was told in court: to discuss at the CBN financial position"Ugra" following the results of the prescription, send a request to the DIA for the preparation of a plan to prevent the bank's bankruptcy, obtain the written consent of the agency and approve its plan at another meeting of the CBN.
“The Central Bank generally looked at the bank’s statements then, saw that it complied with the order on reserves and did not violate the standards?!” - the lawyer of "Ugra" asked several times at the court session. The representative of the Central Bank did not answer - he only insisted that it did not matter for the introduction of the interim administration (the Moscow Arbitration Court supported this position).
No more controversy
The Central Bank explained the introduction of the temporary administration into Yugra by the discovered signs of the withdrawal of assets and false reporting, as well as the “technical” execution of its instructions: the bank formed reserves for some loans, and then disbanded for others. Aroused suspicions and highly profitable for "Ugra" transactions with derivatives.
Petr Aven Member of the Board of Directors and co-owner of Alfa-Bank
Otkritie and Binbank were quite market banks that worked with a large number of borrowers, had large interbank relations, while Yugra mainly lent money to the main shareholder.
According to Shilyaev, the Central Bank employees came with a check in May and did not leave until the very end. This was confirmed in court by a representative of the Central Bank. “A landing party of 30 people was constantly in the bank” and could watch online how Ugra was fulfilling the order, Shilyaev notes.
“We never argued with the Central Bank, we followed all the instructions and recommendations, we strictly followed all regulatory documents regulator and legislation,” he assures. Such humility is not typical. When receiving serious, multibillion-dollar orders between the regulator and the bank, “there is always correspondence and a discussion about the amount of reserves that need to be accrued first,” says Oleg Vyugin, chairman of the board of directors of Safmar Financial Investments, former first deputy chairman of the Central Bank and chairman of the board of directors of MDM Bank : “Evaluation [of collateral by an independent appraiser] is also being used, financial indicators[borrower's] business or something additionally offered [as collateral for the loan]. This is a completely acceptable practice on the part of the Central Bank - a discussion of the figures that they have developed. I don’t know how it is now, but once the Central Bank listened and even sometimes agreed on other figures, less cruel.”
There were no other plans
After a comprehensive audit by the Central Bank in July 2016, the bank received an act on an unformed reserve for 76 billion rubles. The main claims are an incorrect assessment of credit risks and the cost of collateral, says Shilyaev: “The Yugra Methodology”<...>was actually approved by the Central Bank, because [before] it did not cause any complaints. And the bank took into account the pledged property based on the reports of independent appraisers from the top 20.”
The recognition of collateral and the assessment of reserves for corporate borrowers is the most difficult topic when checking banks, there is no standard practice here and there is always a subjective point of view, no methodology will cover all situations, says Pavel Alekseev, head of the Strategy, Planning and Controlling Directorate of OTP Bank: “The professional judgment of a bank and Central Bank specialist plays an important role. Adequate people work in the Central Bank, but with a certain focus - in order to increase the reserves. However, not very bloodthirsty.
After that check, the Central Bank, according to Shilyaev, did not issue an order, Ugra sent objections to the act, in response, the bank was “orally recommended to prepare a plan to improve financial stability” - to eliminate the regulator’s comments. In August, a plan was drawn up with a schedule for the additional accrual of reserves for all 76 billion rubles. in the first six months, registration of additional security and additional capitalization of the bank, and in the next six months - registration of real estate being built by borrowers as collateral, he says: “The plan was corrected after the regulator's comments about some minor inconsistencies. There were no other plans."
Dmitry Shilyaev former chairman of the board of bank "Ugra"
It seems that the implementation of the next order unnerved the regulator, who expected that we should lie down and give up.
10 borrowers, suspected by the Central Bank of inaccurate reporting, received confirmation from the auditors about the correctness of the reflection of transactions, new assessments of collateral were ordered with a confirming examination of the SRO, Shilyaev lists: “In six months, we have formed reserves in the amount of more than 76 billion rubles. and [then] reduced by collateral. In total, collateral for 150 billion rubles was issued. But we have not corrected all the reserves, but about 60 billion – that is, the net additional creation of reserves was up to 20 billion.”
Here's how it was: every month the bank formed reserves for a part of the portfolio, and the next month they reduced them by issuing new collateral, eliminating comments to borrowers (on the grounds of unrealistic activity). This is called improving the quality of the loan portfolio, says Shilyaev. The Central Bank took it differently.
By March 1, Yugra fulfilled the plan and reported to the Central Bank, but it began to send new instructions - including based on the July 2016 inspection report, Shilyaev claims: closer to 11 o'clock, they handed over an order to complete the reserves for at least 46 billion rubles, they gave three weeks to complete it.
All or nothing
There were a lot of inconsistencies in the prescription, Shilyaev claims: for example, to form reserves for borrowers who have already repaid their debt. In reality, 57.7 billion rubles had to be formed, he says: “We were shocked, because the bank had already digested these reserves and there were no comments.” But the bank complied with this order, the capital dipped to 33 billion rubles.
It could have been worse: in June, the bank received by compensation the shares of nine companies (everywhere less than 20%) with licenses for 28 oil fields: Erbogachenskoye, Nizhnekirenskoye, Moktakonskoye, etc. As a result of tripartite transactions between Yugra, its borrowers and owners assets were repaid loans for more than 8 billion rubles. - by transferring pledged shares to the bank, valued at 19.3 billion (Vedomosti has copies of the reports).
On June 13, Yugra reported on the fulfillment of the May order. And on the evening of June 21, a new one came - it had to be completed no later than the next day and report before June 26 inclusive. “It was again based on the July act of 2016,” says Shilyaev. “And we concluded that the Central Bank is taking all possible actions so that we violate either the requirements of the order or the regulations.” “Even if the borrower is no longer there, the bank specified in the order is obliged to create a reserve and wait until the Central Bank sorts it out and admits the mistake – these are the rules,” he complains.
The new instruction required to complete the reserves by adjusting the cost of collateral for loans of 34 borrowers in accordance with the fair value established by the Central Bank (35.4 billion rubles against 97 billion in the bank's calculations), and for three borrowers not to take into account the pledged property at all. These are Irelyakhneft, LLC Meridian and Multanovskoye, which laid oil wells, gas lift lines and plumes from wells. The document does not contain data on Meridian, but there is data on Irelyakhneft and Multanovsky: the debt to the bank is 17.4 billion rubles, the cost of collateral is 12.6 billion according to Yugra and 8.3 billion according to the Central Bank .
170 billion rubles
This is how much the deposits in Yugra were insured, in total the population kept 184.7 billion rubles in the bank. (data of the Central Bank). With "the most optimistic approach to assessing the imbalance of Yugra, the necessary funding for reorganization would exceed the size of the DIA's insurance liability," the regulator noted. The Central Bank explained the collapse of Yugra by its business model: at the expense of individuals, projects related to beneficiaries were financed, and the scale of the borrowers' activities did not correspond to the size of the loans
The regulator did not allow to take into account the cost of collateral to reduce reserves - it is applicable only when selling a business as a whole, because "objects<...>are not able to generate income in isolation from the entire property complex of the field,” the Central Bank said. “The cost of collateral was ordered to be zeroed, although we explained to the Central Bank that the property complex was divided among several collateral agreements for one borrower. Previously, the regulator was calm about this,” says Shilyaev.
If the property complex is divided under loan agreements, but is pledged to the bank for one borrower, this is a strong position, says a former top manager of banks from the top 20: “The Central Bank allows in this case to reduce reserves through collateral.” But reputation is of paramount importance here, he notes: “If a bank has cheated the regulator more than once, then there is no trust in it. And even when the entire property complex is pledged under one agreement, the Central Bank begins to doubt the bank's estimates. If the bank has a good reputation, then 20 pledge agreements are not a problem.”
Vyugin draws attention to the fact that the Central Bank did not respond to Ugra's objections to the verification act: “Some kind of strange practice, perhaps this means that trust has been completely destroyed. In principle, the Central Bank responds to letters, at least they should answer: “Our position has remained unchanged, your arguments do not work for such and such a reason.”
Loss by time
"Ugra" again found a way out. This time, the shareholder forgave her $85 million in subordinated deposits. Since 2015, Khotin has thus helped the bank for $ 780 million - as the Central Bank suspects, due to a scheme with loans. "Ugra" again reported - the order was fulfilled, everything is in order, says Shilyaev.
A new order - because of which Shilyaev waited in vain for guests from Balchug - came on July 6th. This time real estate came to the rescue: the bank received 115,450 sq. m. m of space in Moscow's business centers with a market value of 16.9 billion rubles, while loans for about 3 billion were terminated, says Shilyaev: "This difference made it possible to fulfill the order." But the Central Bank calculated that the fair value of these assets is 6.4 billion rubles, and in a couple of weeks - already 5.2 billion, he continues.
Shilyaev speaks of two orders from the interim administration: on July 12 - to reflect in the balance sheet of July 10 the received property based on the Central Bank's assessment (minus 10.5 billion rubles from capital), on July 27 - to adjust its value based on the new assessment of the Central Bank of July 26 , and reflect the postings on July 21. In total, Yugra, which reported daily to the Central Bank, had at least three orders from the interim administration dated July 27 (Vedomosti has copies) that adjusted the balance on the operating day of June 21 - that is, retroactively.
“In this case, the Central Bank writes: “Incorrect accounting, inaccurate reporting.” It is safe to say that for a bank that submits reports on a daily basis, sanctions would follow for this, ”says Parfenov. - But this is a monument, who will plant it! This is bad, but they have created such a system, according to which they themselves have a certain judgment, they force others to fulfill it. But they treat themselves very condescendingly.
On July 10, by order, subsoil users' papers received under the compensation were transferred to those valued at cost, their positive revaluation was canceled and provisions were formed for possible losses on them in the amount of 50-100%. Bottom line: on the balance sheet of Yugra, net investments in these shares turned out to be 6 times cheaper than they were - 3.2 billion rubles.
The discrepancies in field valuations could be much larger, says Sergey Vakhrameev, portfolio manager at GL Asset Management: “Everyone has a different geology, it can cost $1/bbl in reserves, or it can cost nothing at all. To assess the value of an asset, inside information is needed: how the field will be developed, when it will reach the peak of production, what kind of oil will be. But the most important parameter is the proven reserves.” All fields are small, with unconfirmed reserves, far from communications, production at most is planned only from 2018. It is still impossible to objectively assess their investment value, Vakhrameev says, or a very large fork will turn out.
Relations with the regulator at Yugra deteriorated in the spring of 2015 - after being included in the list of banks published by the DIA for additional capitalization through OFZ, Shilyaev believes. But at a meeting in the Central Bank, it was orally proposed to refuse, according to Shilyaev, after which pressure began: new checks with instructions, a requirement to disclose the beneficiaries (so among them, with a share of 52%, Alexey Khotin appeared, whom the market considered the owner of Yugra, but the bank is categorically denied), in 2016 - limiting the size of deposits and rates on them, the bank was transferred under supervision to Moscow and to a daily reporting form, he lists. “The bank met all the criteria [for additional capitalization]. We asked the Central Bank to explain which paragraph of the law we do not comply with, but we did not receive an answer, ”complains Shilyaev. In the spring of 2016, Yugra withdrew its application for additional capitalization for 9.9 billion rubles, but "the Central Bank got a taste," he says.
Another order from the DIA on July 10 is to create 100% reserves under forward contracts with CJSC Extract-Fili and LLC Vostok-Burenie for 13.1 billion rubles, concluded in 2015-2016. with settlements in 2018. “This is nonsense, the reserve is formed only for assets that carry the risk of default,” says Shilyaev. “And under these contracts, the counterparty must transfer rubles, and only then the bank must deliver the currency.”
Usually, forwards are valued at fair value (based on expected profit), which depends on the volatility of the underlying asset, says Fitch senior analyst Alexander Danilov: “I don’t even remember banks creating reserves for them, especially for the entire amount of the contract, most likely just a mistake." The DIA corrected it with an order dated July 27: to restore (i.e., cancel) all these reserves - by 13.1 billion rubles, moreover, on the trading day of July 21.
The next day, July 28, the Central Bank revoked the Yugra license, justifying this by the fact that on July 22, after the additional creation of reserves, the negative capital exceeded 7 billion rubles.
Shilyaev believes that the regulators adjusted the figures, and expects to challenge their actions in court.
The main thing is not the form, but the content, Danilov notes: “Perhaps, from a formal point of view, it matters what date this or that decision of the Central Bank / Interim Administration was issued, but much more important (for example, for creditors) is the question of what bank actually there are assets and what is their real value.
Come on, rate
All reports on the evaluation of the oil assets that ended up in Yugra were prepared in five days by one expert from the Business Valuation Bureau. He evaluated these companies when their shares were pledged in Yugra, so it was logical for him to re-evaluate, including because of the timing, explains Shilyaev. The Business Valuation Bureau did not respond to a request.
The real estate received under the compensation was evaluated by five companies. Esardzhi-assessment, accredited at the DIA, diverged from the Central Bank by 3.4 times, the Bureau of City Cadastre - by 5 times. “We do not look at the Central Bank and other comrades,” said Roman Beloborodov, general director of the bureau. - We have a license, we are checked, we are not some fake one-day. We are independent experts, we analyzed the market, we thought that the numbers are like that.” Other evaluators declined to comment.
S.A. Ricci, at the request of Vedomosti, estimated the market value of all 29 Yugra real estate objects: 17–21 billion rubles. “The assets are quite worthy, they are able to generate a rental flow,” says the CEO of S.A. Ricci Alexander Morozov.
Did the main owner of Yugra Bank, who owes 180 billion rubles to depositors, leave Russia on a private plane?
As it became known to Rucriminal.com, the bankrupt millionaire Alexei Khotin, whose Yugra bank owes 180 billion rubles to depositors, hastily left Russia. It happened at the end of last week. Khotin flew away on a private plane and is not going to return to his temporary homeland (he spent most of his life in Belarus). Khotin needed Russia only to fill his own "pockets" with gigantic sums.
So all the statements and demands of the head of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, Elvira Nabiullina, about the need to legally restrict the travel abroad of heads and owners of banks with signs of asset withdrawal, were too late. But, according to Rucriminal.com, it is not too late to take other actions to prevent Khotin from selling all his Russian assets and sending the proceeds abroad. To do this, it is necessary to urgently seize the shopping centers, oil companies, etc., recorded on Sergei Podlysetsky. This is Khotin's adjutant, to whom the millionaire recorded assets, in case of interest in him from law enforcement agencies.
Elvira Nabiullina
Swiss citizen Alexey Khotin
As Rucriminal.com already reported, the empire of the former millionaire, and now bankrupt Alexei Khotin, collapsed. In his bank "Ugra" administration was introduced in the person of the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). A moratorium on settlements with creditors was also introduced, and the powers of the management and the main owner, Alexei Khotin, were terminated. The Bank of Russia announced that it would conduct a survey of the financial condition of the bank, but it is already clear to the Central Bank that most of the assets have been withdrawn from the bank. The Central Bank sent a corresponding appeal to law enforcement agencies. Khotin rushed to his former patrons, but they bashfully turned away from him. Contact the person who threw ordinary citizens, who invested 180 billion rubles in Yugra at the promised high interest rates, no one wants. Then, Alexei jumped into his beloved Bombardier and left Moscow in a hurry. He can live happily abroad until the end of his days. Khotin built an entire empire out of offshore companies, to which tens of millions of dollars were withdrawn. Responsible for the activities of this empire Peter Brazhnikov - founder law firm Brazhnikov&Partners Ltd (Cyprus) and his employee Maria Clerides. Rucriminal.com advises law enforcement agencies to interrogate Khotin's subordinates Natalya Rakhova and Vladimir Konstantinov, who in Russia helped the boss build an offshore paradise and know where Alexei hid the money.
Alexey Khotin. Photo: rucriminal.com
This is not a big secret for Rucriminal.com either. Khotin has long chosen Switzerland as a place to live (Russia for him was only a platform for “making money”). Sometimes he spent two months in this country during the year. Radamant Financial AG is registered in the Swiss Sarnen, through which Khotin owned Yugra. In this country, he bought real estate and applied for citizenship.
Khotin - no, but Podlysetsky remained
Moreover, Khotin hopes that the Russian treasury will take on the entire burden of responsibility for the money withdrawn by him from the Yugra depositors. He hopes that even Russian assets he will be able to save. To do this, he prudently wrote them down on his manager Sergei Podlysetsky. And he urgently sells these assets in order to send funds to his boss abroad.
So, the famous Moscow shopping complex "Gorbushkin Dvor", the former headquarters of Khotin, changed its owner - Sergey Podlisetsky sold it to the owner of the Pharmstandard holding, Viktor Kharitonin. Podlysetsky is also the head of the Rus Oil oil company, although according to Rucriminal.com, he is a nominal and dependent figure. Such a modern "zitz-chairman Fuchs." Although the official seller of the "Gorbushka" was the zits-chairman Podlisetsky, the real owners of the "Gorbushkin Dvor" are considered to be Alexei and Yuri Khotin - father and son. This shopping complex came under their control in 2011, when the Complex Investments company bought Gorbushkin Dvor and the neighboring shopping center"Filion" at MTZ "Rubin".
The Khotins moved to Moscow in the late 1990s, when people from the Belarusian government structures began to slowly move there, saving their money from the Old Man. Including the former manager of affairs of the President of the Republic Ivan Titenkov. Naturally, the Belarusian officials had good connections with the Russian state structures, which helped to develop business in Russia. Most likely, the Khotins built their business on the money that they managed to withdraw from Belarus. Evidence of the Belarusian source of funds for the Khotins is the fact that a certain Lagvinets was appointed the general director of their oil company Dulisma - the same friend of Ivan Titenkov, the owner of Konto Holdings, against whom a high-profile criminal case has been opened in Belarus. Because of this, they both left for Russia, where they created several companies with Belarusian money of clearly criminal origin.
Khotin and Podlysetsky have long-standing partnerships: back in 1997, Podlysetsky became the manager of a cosmetics factory owned by the Khotins. held office CEO at the Moscow soap factory, which the Khotins captured as a result of a raider operation. In the business community, Sergei Podlysetsky is openly considered the capital's "purse" of Belarusian businessmen. He himself claims that he made his fortune in commercial real estate, but it is well known that the money for buying assets was constantly provided to him by the father and son of Khotin. They allegedly “loaned” Podlisetsky to buy Gorbushka, the cost of which at that time was about 400 million dollars. Now the zits-director for some reason sold the shopping center - an extremely liquid asset, which almost never had financial problems and problems with renting premises, even during the crisis, the shopping center worked without any major upheavals. According to some sources, the amount of the deal could be around $500 million.
In fact, Mr. Podlysetsky is just a nominal owner of “his” assets, all his “business activities” are clearly correlated with the interests and affairs of the Khotins, who own little directly. Cunning Belarusians are among the most non-public businessmen and successfully hide even from journalists' cameras. As Rucriminal.com has said more than once, their business is based on the takeover and raider takeovers of Moscow factories and factories, which then turn into shopping and business centers. These assets are managed by the firms Kub, Art-vising, Center-T, New life group and others, which are usually led by Sergey Podlisetsky. In the same way, he became the head of the Rus Oil oil company, the money for the purchase of which was given by all the same Khotins.
Now the "successful businessman" Sergei Podlisetsky is forced to urgently sell "his" assets, which, in fact, do not belong to him, but to the Khotin family. Zits-Chairman Podlisetsky is just one of the shadow managers, to whom dozens of companies are registered, designed to save the business empire of the Khotin family after the collapse of the Yugra bank. This connection is obvious even without banking documents, from which it follows that all of Podlysetsky's oil companies (Rus Oil, NK Dulisma, Exillon Energy) were fueled by money withdrawn from Yugra under the guise of loans. Now the fate of this "fake" businessman completely depends on the decision of the Central Bank and law enforcement agencies in relation to "Ugra".
Vedomosti , 19.07.17 , “Bank Yugra received a loss of 17 billion rubles before the collapse”
Shortly before the appointment of an interim administration to the Yugra bank, its capital decreased by 17.7 billion rubles. up to 32.4 billion rubles, according to the reporting for June. The provisional administration entered the bank on 10 July.
A loss led to a decrease in the bank's capital, explains ACRA analyst Kirill Lukashuk. In June, Yugra received a loss of 17 billion rubles, follows from the reporting. “In connection with the strict instructions of the Central Bank, the bank still had to create reserves, which led to a loss,” Lukashuk points out.
Central Bank for Last year issued 10 instructions to Ugra to add up reserves for tens of billions of rubles, said Anna Orlenko, director of the banking supervision department. The bank "technically" fulfilled the regulator's instructions: it added the required reserves for some loans, dissolving them for others, she explained. The regulator also discovered technical transactions with derivative financial instruments that allowed Yugra to reflect profit, added Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Vasily Pozdyshev: “We have reason to believe that this profit is technical, i.e. these are transactions carried out technically in order to show profit balance sheet. Based on this, the Central Bank concluded that the bank's statements were unreliable.
Over the past year, the Central Bank issued 10 orders to Yugra on the additional formation of reserves for tens of billions of rubles, said Anna Orlenko, director of the banking supervision department.
In the second half of May, the Central Bank issued an order to Ugra to create reserves for about 40 billion rubles, Vedomosti's interlocutors said. According to two of them, the Central Bank extended the period for the bank to create reserves until mid-July. In June, Yugra formed reserves for loans to non-state commercial enterprises for 29.8 billion rubles. (the depreciation of this portfolio reached 45.7%), Yury Belikov, the chief methodologist of Expert RA, calculated. According to him, Yugra also fully reserved investments in the acquired rights of claim for 2.8 billion rubles, the coverage of which by reserves had previously been minimal.
The bank probably tried to use emergency measures to support capital, Belikov believes: in the reporting, Yugra revalued other shares of non-residents and residents by 9 billion rubles. At the same time, these securities were not even on the balance sheet until June, he emphasizes. “When such anomalies begin to appear in the reporting of a bank that is experiencing problems with meeting regulatory capital requirements, it may just be an attempt to paint on the reporting,” Belikov said.
Shareholders tried to support the falling capital in other ways: they forgave deposits on subordinated loans for 24.6 billion rubles. and the bank reflected this as grant funding from the owners, Belikov said. “This is the last attempt of the shareholders to support the bank. In vain, because the additional reservation, which, most likely, was prescribed by the regulator, turned out to be too large, ”he argues.
As of July 1, Ugra did not violate capital adequacy standards (like everyone else), even taking into account capital allowances, according to its statements. There was no formal violation of the standards, but this is a matter of economic feasibility of reflecting the indicated revaluation of securities in the capital (if not for it, the bank would have violated the H1.0 standard) and the level of real depreciation of assets, which the interim administration has yet to determine, Belikov concluded.
In June, the deposits of individuals in Yugra increased by 3 billion rubles, it follows from the reporting, despite the fact that the regulator limited the bank to attract funds from individuals. The Central Bank suspects Yugra of manipulating deposits, Pozdyshev shared: “The bank has been on the limit since April last year. Nevertheless, especially recently, quite active advertising has appeared, however, this is not reflected in the balance in any way, ”said the deputy chairman of the Central Bank.
Alexey Nefedov
The ex-president of Yugra, Alexei Nefedov, did not answer calls.
The increase in deposits may indicate a direct violation of the instructions of the Central Bank, says Natalia Borzova, Deputy General Director of Finexpertiza. She believes that this may indicate the absence of off-balance sheet deposits, since the bank shows an increase in deposits in the reporting.
Yugra became the champion of 2016 in terms of losses: 32.2 billion rubles. The main reason is the same - reserves.
Anna Eremina, Mikhail Tegin
The bank "Ugra" yesterday was introduced administration in the person of the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA). A moratorium on settlements with creditors was also introduced, and the powers of the management and the main owner, Alexei Khotin, were terminated. The Bank of Russia announced that it would conduct a survey of the financial condition of the bank. The regulator was questioned by Yugra's clients in the oil industry and legal entities involved in real estate. Assets in these industries formed the basis of the non-banking business of the main owner of the bank, Alexei Khotin
The bank had a high concentration of loans to owners, says Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank Vasily Pozdyshev. “Most of the loan portfolio was used to finance the business of the owners. In our opinion, the bank used schemes to bypass the risk limitation on owners (regulated by the Central Bank standard - no more than 25% of the capital, at "Ugra" on June 1, according to official reports, own funds was 50 billion rubles, RBC data). But it is necessary not only to assume, but also to prove,” he added. According to Stanislav Volkov, Director of Banking Ratings at RAEX (Ugra refused to participate in the rating of this agency), loans related parties in mid-2015 accounted for about a third of the bank's portfolio. “Basically, these are companies that rent out real estate and the oil sector,” says Volkov. “The bank itself does not recognize this.”
It is possible to judge the composition of a small part of the loan portfolio from the data of the Kontur-Focus system. According to them, many pledges in the Yugra bank are really connected with Khotin, his managers and acquaintances. An example is the Surguttrans company of Anastasia Makarova (She is also involved in managing the assets of Alexei Khotin) - the company laid down an oil pipeline from Travyanoye to Multanovskoye field with a length of 148 km in the Khanty-Mansiysk - Yugra district and forest areas with an area of 101.3 hectares and 540 hectares in that same area. The loan amount is unknown.
Makarova was the founder and head of a number of companies that are associated with Khotin - CJSC Kub and LLC Second Real Estate Agency. The tax authorities tried to interrogate her in the case of tax violations, but she did not appear on the agenda and did not provide the documents of the Federal Tax Service. It got to the point that in 2015 representatives of the Federal Tax Service tried to find her through investigators from the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Krasnogorsk region. The activities of her company were considered extremely suspicious by the tax authorities - the company did not have significant property and transport, the company's staff consisted of one person.
Other bank loans could also be issued through an acquaintance or to maintain relationships. Khotin’s manager, former head of Negusneft and Sky Property (manages Alexei Khotin’s real estate assets), Mark Lapunov took out a loan for a blue BMW X6M, and the Equipport company, the daughter of the head of the FSB’s operations support service, Mikhail Shekin, Anastasia Zadorina, received funds secured by a dozen sewing machines, ironing tables and heat presses. The companies of Khotin and his partners previously supported.
Loans related to oil and construction business, were taken by little-known and small companies - they were taken by the companies Yuzhno-Vladigorskoye, Burneft (laid drilling rigs), Promdelo, etc. Not the best business centers of the Khotin empire were laid in the Yugra bank - BC East Gate (53,000 sq.m.), Technopark-Sintez (12,000 sq.m.), Au-room (20,000 sq.m.). The highest quality objects of Khotin were laid in Alfa Bank, VTB, Sberbank and Rosselkhozbank. There is no information about serious loans of Yugra issued to large and understandable borrowers in the Contour Focus database.
Last year, the partners of Alexei Khotin, the owner of the Complex Investments holding, argued that he was not the owner of the oil assets. According to the representative of Rus-Oil Eduard Sapunkov, Khotin is not related to his company, and its owner is Sergey Podlesetsky (he previously worked with Khotin). He assures that the attempt to connect the Rus-Oil companies with Khotin carries a "negative connotation." Sapunkov explained that the oil companies Dulisma, Matyushkina Vertikal (ex-assets of the Hungarian MOL), Polar Lights, Gustorechenskoye, Negusneft, Irelyakhneft and Development of St. Petersburg (their total reserves are more than 100,000 tons of oil) Khotin does not belong either.
According to Sapunkov, the owners of the assets that the media previously attributed to Khotin are also Sergei Koshelenko. Earlier, Koshelenko claimed that he bought Northern Lights from Rosneft and the American ConocoPhillips with his personal savings and credit money. According to Forbes, the cost of the purchase was about $150-200 million.
Perhaps the managers who worked with Khotin became very wealthy. In 2014, Koshelenko managed to buy out an additional issue of Otkritie Bank in the amount of 10 billion rubles. In general, only for the above oil assets, according to Forbes, .
From the statements of the representatives of the regulator, it followed that the actions of the bank were enough for the Central Bank to turn to law enforcement agencies. “We sent appeals to law enforcement agencies that relate to the work of the bank,” said Vasily Pozdyshev.
Investigative committee. As follows from the message, he is suspected of embezzling 7.5 billion rubles from Yugra. The case was initiated under Part 4 of Art. 160 of the Criminal Code (misappropriation or embezzlement, the maximum punishment is 10 years in prison and a fine of 1 million rubles).
What is Khotyn famous for?
Natives of Belarus Alexei Khotin and father Yuri have been doing business in Moscow since the 1990s: they bought factories and factories, rebuilt them into business centers and rented them out. “Khotins chose a clear niche: they took large enterprises with a large number of buildings and created entire business parks,” Forbes top manager of one of the lending banks. At the same time, the Khotins remained one of the most closed businessmen in Russia. As the interlocutors of Vedomosti told in 2016, the same atmosphere of secrecy reigns in their companies. On the Khotins, they mainly work former employees authorities, their offices are like bunkers, people do not know what their neighbor is doing, one of the partners of the businessmen told the newspaper. In the past few years, the younger Khotin managed all the assets, his father retired, sources told Forbes and Vedomosti.
Forbes interlocutors associated Khotin's business success with his ability to build relationships with influential people. In particular, a member of the Forbes list, working with Khotin in the same market, that behind the businessman is the ex-Speaker of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov. Khotin's acquaintances said that Gryzlov used to call the bankers himself to persuade them to issue loans to the Khotin companies. Gryzlov declined to comment. Khotin is also among the sponsors of designer Anastasia Zadorina, daughter of Mikhail Shekin, head of the FSB Operations Support Service of Russia. Her company, ZA Sport, designed the uniforms of the Russian team for the Pyeongchang Games and anti-sanction T-shirts with the words “Sanctions? Do not make my Iskanders laugh”, “Poplar is not afraid of sanctions” and others.
Yuri Khotin never hid that Gryzlov solves problems for them, and in general he always behaved like a person who is not afraid of anything and is very confident in himself, a former high-ranking official who went into business told Vedomosti. The Khotins proved that the expression “don’t have a hundred rubles, but have a hundred friends” is not just a proverb, but a line from a business plan, one of their creditors noted. "You can tell it's real. Russian history success, in which people disposed as start-up capital connections with the security forces and skillfully used them,” he said.
In addition to real estate, the Khotins also had oil assets - a stake in Exillon Energy and Dulisma, as well as Yugra Bank. As of July 2017, Yugra ranked 30th among Russian banks in terms of assets.
The collapse of Yugra
In July 2017, the Central Bank introduced a temporary administration to Yugra. The circumstances of its introduction were unprecedented for the Russian banking system - the Prosecutor General's Office protested the orders of the Bank of Russia on the introduction of an interim administration and a moratorium on satisfying creditors' claims, declaring the regulator's decisions groundless and harmful to the budget (this protest had no consequences). Shortly after the introduction of the temporary administration, at the end of July 2017, Yugra's license was revoked. This was the largest insured event in the history of Russian banks. The amount of payments to depositors amounted to 170 billion rubles.
Back in July 2017, the Central Bank came to the conclusion that 90% of Yugra's loan portfolio was in business related to the projects of the bank's owners. As RBC wrote in October 2018, bankruptcy proceedings were initiated or were about to begin against dozens of creditor companies (in total, these companies took out loans in Yugra for 270 billion rubles).
The case of Yugra bank is “one of the most unpleasant in a series of reviews due to the irresponsible behavior of the owners, who created a “pocket” bank to finance, first of all, their projects, but at the same time actively, in the case of Yugra, very aggressively, circumvented the restrictions regulator, attracting funds from depositors, the loan portfolio was of poor quality, and most of the collateral was issued with signs of overvaluation,” said the head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina in September 2017. Former shareholders of the bank have repeatedly tried to challenge the actions of the Central Bank and the bankruptcy of the bank, but to no avail.
Petr Sarukhanov / "New"
The Central Bank unscheduledly checked the bank "Ugra" in January 2017 and demanded to complete the reserves for borrowers. Many collaterals for loans in this bank, as Forbes reported, were associated with the main owner of the bank, Alexei Khotin, his top managers and acquaintances.
On April 25, Ugra depositors were unable to receive money. The situation soon returned to normal. The bank explained this as a power failure. But analysts began to speculate about a possible lack of liquidity. After that, the Central Bank began another unscheduled inspection and on July 10 he appointed a temporary administration in Yugra.
Only nine days later, the Prosecutor General's Office appealed the decision of the Central Bank, which had never been done before in such cases. Sources of Novaya Gazeta, who are familiar with the situation, say that this protest, in fact, repeated the arguments of representatives of the Yugra bank, which the Central Bank did not take into account, and the maximum that this prosecutor's protest could help was to provide a few days to save some then parts of the money. As a result, the Central Bank rejected the protest of the Prosecutor General's Office.
The events around the Yugra bank, owned by Alexei Khotin, in which the Central Bank recently introduced a temporary administration, is a story of how, despite the extensive connections of Alexei’s son and his father Yuri, businessmen never became “their own people” in a cramped court circle, although, however, they achieved several surprising preferences, plus the unprecedented intercession of the Prosecutor General's Office, which protested the decision of the Central Bank. However, this protest, as Novaya Gazeta's sources in power structures say, can only give a few days for the bank's owners to try to save some money.
The rules by which almost all Russian entrepreneurs live look something like this:
- a non-Sicilian will not become a full member of the “godfather” family,
- a bastard will not receive the same status as a legitimate heir to the throne.
- And if you are not Yuri Kovalchuk (Bank Rossiya) and not Arkady Rotenberg (SMP Bank), then the really big problems of your bank will not be solved at the highest state level.
Feeding the courtiers, of course, allows tactical issues to be settled, but if the problem becomes too big, the courtiers quickly wash their hands of it.
Alexey and Yuri Khotin are so non-public that for a long time we did not know what they looked like. We publish photos of the Khotins, which appeared only once on a resource that has long ceased to exist. The identity of the photographs was confirmed to Novaya Gazeta by two people who know the Khotins Until recently, the Khotins were doing well. They moved to Moscow in 1997 from Belarus, where they sold perfumes and cosmetics. At the new location, they became interested in real estate and in twenty years they have gone from the owners of part of the building of the bankrupt Mikoms meat processing plant to eighth place in the Forbes rating “Kings of Russian Real Estate 2017” with an annual rental income of $ 295 million. The Khotins own the Moscow Hotel (Four Seasons), that a stone's throw from the Kremlin, they owned Gorbushkin Dvor and about 40 other objects, as Vedomosti calculated.
In 2010, the Khotins bought the Urals Energy oil company from Sberbank with an interesting history. This company arose in the late eighties with the sanction of the head of the first main department of the KGB of the USSR (foreign intelligence) Leonid Shebarshin as a cover for studying shadow export channels, in 1990 it embarked on an independent commercial voyage and first went to the former intelligence officers and son-in-law of Boris Yeltsin - Leonid Dyachenko, and then Sberbank for debts. Urals Energy became the basis of the Khotins' oil company, Dulisma.
Khotins continuously received loans from state banks and preferential export duties for their Dulisma. These benefits will cost the budget 92.5 billion rubles until 2033, as Finance Minister Anton Siluanov told Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev in the spring of 2015 (the letter was obtained by RBC).
Khotins were credited by the state-owned Rosselkhozbank, Sberbank and VTB. Moreover, they did not stop lending even after VTB had already managed to sue a company from the Khotin group, which in 2009 stopped servicing a debt of 5 billion rubles.
Where do these opportunities come from? The Khotins were connected with well-known officials. So, for example, when Sberbank, given the strange history with the debt, did not want to extend their credit line, the head of Sberbank German Gref, as Vedomosti reported, received a call from Sergei Mironov, who was then the speaker of the Federation Council. Mironov himself denied this. Khotin is not a stranger to the former Minister of the Interior, ex-Chairman of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov, and the former director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev. They were associated with success in extending export duty exemptions for Dulisma. There were talks that President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko does not offend Khotins. The board of directors of their company included the former head of the presidential administration of Belarus, Ural Latypov, who in the early 1970s studied at the higher KGB courses in Minsk (at about the same time Patrushev studied there).
Khotin actively invested in oil and real estate. At the end of 2013, they bought Exillon Energy, which produces oil in the Komi and Khanty-Mansiysk District, in 2015, the Irelyakhneft company from Alrosa for 1.8 billion rubles. The plans were grandiose - to collect their oil companies, enter the IPO and attract big money from investors.
But the real estate market sank. Oil prices have dropped. And the Khotins' grandiose investments in the purchase of new assets were made mainly through loans secured by the same real estate, the income from which is now falling. Hotins began to be refinanced in their own bank "Ugra". And soon the Central Bank noticed that Ugra issued half of the loans to companies associated with it. According to the requirements of the Central Bank, the owners of Yugra, of course, replenished the reserves for billions of rubles, as the representative of the bank told news agencies, but, as Anna Orlenko, director of the Central Bank’s banking supervision department, told Vedomosti, these reserves were technically created for one loan and immediately left for others.
The Khotins' problems are not the only ones of their kind. Previously, the owners of Vneshprombank, Larisa Markus and Georgy Bedzhamov, have already found themselves in a similar situation, with whom the largest state-owned companies held deposits.
Ziyad Manasir with his wife. Moscow, 2011. Photo: RIA Novosti Ziyad Manasir, a former Gazprom contractor, faced similar difficulties a few years ago. He also fed half of the state monopoly, built palaces and invested in real estate. But when there was less money, he very quickly noticed that those whom he fed for so long were in no hurry to meet him halfway. Manasir had to give up his company. He ceased to be a major Gazprom contractor. For Markus and Bedzhamov, everything ended in a criminal case.
The courtiers, who were friends with the Khotins in their fat years, cannot solve such difficult issues as lack of money. They are able to solve something only when there is money.
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